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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE BP
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
HARI M. OSOFSKY, KATE BAXTER-KAUF, BRADLEY HAMMER, ANN
MAILANDER, BRETT MARES, AMY PIKOVSKY, ANDREW WHITNEY &
LAURA WILSON*
This Article analyzes the environmental justice implications
of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and proposes ways to
better address these concerns currently and in the future. It
explores the justice problems that have arisen with respect to the
spill response, compensation, and employment and workers. The
Article argues that these problems result from a mix of inadequate
information, failure to incorporate environmental justice into
planning, and statutory provisions that favor oil companies and
limit protections for vulnerable populations. It proposes ways in
which to address these causes in the context of this disaster and
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Life Sciences and Joint Degree Program in Law, Health & the Life Sciences;
Affiliated Faculty, Geography and Conservation Biology. The other authors are
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Osofsky's fall 2010 course Environmental Justice and the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill, which submitted 316 pages on these issues to the National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. This
article draws from that submission, which has not been published elsewhere. The
article, also has been shaped helpfully by feedback and questions during
presentations at Hamline University School of Law, the University of Minnesota
Law School, the University of Oregon School of Law, the American Society of
International Law International Economic Law Interest Group's 2010 Biennial
Conference, the AALS 2010 Annual Meeting, and the Society of Environmental
Chemistry and Toxicology-Midwest Chapter 2012 Annual Meeting. We
particularly appreciate the thoughtful commentary of Rebecca Bratspies, Daniel
Farber, and Zygmunt Plater, and excellent editorial assistance of the New York
University Environmental Law Journal, including Brian Korpics, Mark LeBel,
Philip Smithback, Heather Lewis, Christine Yurechko, and Darci Frinquelli. Kate
Baxter-Kauf was employed as a law clerk while this Article was being prepared
at Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., which has filed a tort action currently
pending as part of MDL No. 2179. She has never worked on the case, has no
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opinion of Lockridge Grindal Nauen. We also would like to thank our families
for their love, support, and patience. We dedicate this paper to the victims of the
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and their advocates, as well as to the memories
of Luke Cole and Keith Aoki.
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more broadly.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ............................... ....... 101
I. Barriers to Legal Protection of Environmental Justice ............ 103
A. Substantive and Structural Intersectionality ...... ..... 104
B. Transnational Energy Production and Consumption.......... 106
II. Justice Concerns with the Spill Response.. ................ 110
A. Waste Disposal ..................................... 110
1.The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) .... 112
2. Executive Order 12,898: "Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low
Income Populations . ...................... ...... 117
B.Health............. .................... ..... 1 21
III. Justice Concerns with Compensation ................. 1 27
A. Oil Pollution Act and Compensation ........... ..... 1 27
B. Gulf Coast Claims Facility................ ........... 130
1. Allowed Claims..................... ......... 130
2. Emergency Advance Payments Deadline ................ 134
3. Sources of GCCF Funds............................. 137
C. Governmental Distribution of Funds ...... 39.......139
1.Federal ......... . ................... ..... 1 39
2. State and Local Government ........................... 143
D. Litigation ............................... ..... 1 46
1. Private Litigation ................. ............... 146
2. The Oil Pollution Act and Environmental Law ................ 150
IV. Justice Concerns with Employment and Workers................. 154
A. Employment Loss and Opportunities ........ ........ 154
1. Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Gulf Employment.......... 154
2. Industries Benefiting from the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill ................................ ...... 156
3. Industries Negatively Impacted by the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill .......................... ..... 157
4. Long Term Gulf Coast Recovery Plan........ .......... 166
B. Cleanup Workers .......................... ..... 1 67
1. Vulnerable Populations Involved in Cleanup Efforts....... 168
2. Health and Safety Concerns Regarding Cleanup
Workers ............................ ............. 172
3. Training of Cleanup Workers ....................... 178
4. Housing of Cleanup Workers .............. ....... 182
C. Oil Rig Workers ................................ 187
100 [Volume 20
BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
1. Safety and Regulatory Issues for Rig Workers................. 187
2. Compensation for Injured Rig Workers..... ........ 189
V. Towards Greater Justice ........................... 193
A. Statutory Reform ......................... ...... 193
B. Better Incorporation of Environmental Justice into
Decision Making ..................................... 195
C. Creation of More Information Pathways ................... 196
Concluding Reflections on the Future of Oil and
Environmental Justice. .................. ........ 198
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, a
wide range of commentators has analyzed why the spill happened
and how both offshore drilling regulation and disaster response
could improve. The National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling's January 2011 report
provides the most comprehensive account thus far, showing the
systematic regulatory failures that caused the spill and proposing
thoughtful reforms.I However, these analyses, to the extent that
they address injustice, mostly focus on particular problems
involving waste disposal, exposure to pollution, income loss, or the
impacts of marsh destruction. They do not address the systematic
differential impacts grounded in law that the spill had on low-
income communities of color.2
This Article fills this important gap. It demonstrates the ways
in which law structures justice problems across a range of different
substantive issues arising from the spill. Consistently, the relevant
I NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL
DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING (2011) [hereinafter
NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT], available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/deepwater/deepwater.pdf.
2 For a discussion of the broader social and ecological context in which the
spill took place, see Daniel A. Farber, The BP Blowout and the Social and
Environmental Erosion of the Louisiana Coast (Berkeley Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Research Paper No. 1740844, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1740844. For a more in-
depth discussion of cleanup worker safety issues, see Rebecca Bratspies et al.,
From Ship to Shore: Reforming the National Contingency Plan to Improve
Protections for Oil Spill Cleanup Workers (Ctr. for Progressive Reform,
Working Paper No. 1006, 2010), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/BPOSHA_1006.pdf.
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law and institutions provide exceptions for oil companies and
inadequately protect vulnerable populations. Despite the Obama
Administration's efforts to incorporate environmental justice
concerns into agency decision-making, the cross-cutting nature of
the spill response meant that these individual agency
environmental justice initiatives often failed to translate into multi-
agency action. Across all of these issues, information limitations
often make the true extent of these problems unknowable. The
demographic data is spotty in contexts most critical to evaluating
environmental injustice. Moreover, it is hard to assess how
problems in conveying important information translate into lack of
access to resources.
This Article also proposes a road forward. It recommends
numerous possibilities for reform to address current injustice and
prevent future injustice. In so doing, it highlights which reforms
are achievable and which ones are unlikely to overcome the
powerful lobbying force of the oil industry. Across the board,
better implementation of existing environmental justice mandates
and more effective strategies around information seem more likely
than major statutory reform. However, even in the legislative
arena, victim-focused changes may be able to gain traction.
This analysis makes an important and innovative contribution
to the scholarly literature in two respects. First, it demonstrates the
systematic failure of our legal system to protect vulnerable
populations in the aftermath of this spill as part of the broader
systematic failures that caused this disaster. The National
Commission's report argues that the blowout.at the Macondo well
was not simply a case of risk probabilities catching up to an
unlucky BP; rather, the spill resulted from systematic regulatory
failures and inadequate industry safety culture.3 Likewise, the
differential impacts on vulnerable populations in the aftermath of
the spill were not an inevitable consequence of inequality in our
society. Regulatory and human choices compounded to make low-
income communities and communities of color more at risk of
unequal impacts in the aftermath of the spill.
Second, the Article's examination of law's role in structuring
unequal distribution of both "goods" and "bads" has broader
implications for environmental justice analysis. It highlights the
need to conceptualize environmental justice problems as much
3 See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at vii.
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more than problematic structural racism bringing unfair
devastating pollution into low-income communities of color. The
response to the spill certainly has such stories, most prominently
the disposal of the vast majority of oil spill waste in communities
that are either majority people of color or whose proportion of
people of color exceeds that of their county's proportion of people
of color. But a focus only on manifestations of traditional
environmental justice would miss a broader pattern of systematic
unfairness. This Article reinforces the importance of weaving
individual instances of unfair distribution of harms and resources
into a broader mosaic of injustice.
Part I provides background on challenges to achieving
environmental justice in order to contextualize the problems raised
by the spill. Part H examines justice concerns arising from the spill
response, with a particular focus on human health and waste
disposal. Part II considers issues of unequal access to
compensation, analyzing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility,
governmental efforts, and litigation. Part IV discusses the
inequalities surrounding employment and cleanup and oil rig
workers with an emphasis on access to economic opportunities and
safety. Part V proposes cross-cutting strategies to address
inadequate information, incomplete implementation of the
executive order on environmental justice, and statutory biases. The
Article concludes with a broader analysis of the intertwined
histories of oil and environmental injustice, and the possibilities
for a better future.
I. BARRIERS TO LEGAL PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
The environmental justice movement, with its focus on the
disproportionate distribution of environmental burdens and
benefits, has long lagged behind both the civil rights and
environmental movements that provide its component parts. To
some extent, this lag results from neither movement treating
environmental justice concerns as its core. However, the nature of
these problems also makes them exceedingly difficult to address.
They cross-cut substantive areas of law and legal structures, and
interact with vexing, hard-to-solve social, political, economic, and
4.
cultural concerns.
4 See, e.g., Sheila Foster, The Challenge of Environmental Justice, 1
RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL'Y 1 (2004); Michael D. Mattheisen, The Effect of
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In the context of the oil industry specifically and energy
industry more broadly, the ways in which law structures these
companies makes them particularly hard to regulate effectively.
Major oil companies are sprawling transnational behemoths which
law regulates in a piecemeal fashion under the authority of many
states and countries. No mechanisms exist to address them
comprehensively at an international level, and corporate law limits
the liability of the parts for one another. These structural concerns
are compounded by the critical role that oil plays in the domestic
and international economy and state sovereignty over natural
resources. This Part explores these barriers to frame the paper's
more specific analysis of environmental justice concerns in the
context of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
A. Substantive and Structural Intersectionality
What is environmental justice? Many hours have been
devoted to debating this question, often with a focus on how broad
the category of environmental justice should be. The core of
environmental justice involves disproportionate environmental
harm suffered by low-income communities of color. But over the
years, those concerned with environmental justice have argued that
these harms occur in a broader context that is part of the fairness
problem. Most significantly, many have argued that environmental
justice does not simply involve harms but also disproportionate
access to environmental benefits, such as open space and parks and
recreation. In addition, some have contended that the concentration
of undesirable land uses-such as drug dealing or detention
centers-in low-income communities of color are part of the
environmental justice problem, even when those activities have
little direct environmental harm.5
Under either a broad or most narrow definition of
environmental justice, many types of law apply to the problem,
each of which has a different core focus. As Hari Osofsky has
Alexander v. Sandoval on Federal Environmental Civil Rights (Environmental
Justice) Policy, 13 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 35 (2003).
5 For analyses of the definition of environmental justice and the evolution
of the movement, see Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice and the Three Great
Myths of White Americana, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 573
(2008); Luke W. Cole & Caroline Farrell, Structural Racism, Structural
Pollution and the Need for a New Paradigm, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 265
(2006); Eileen Gauna & Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice: Stakes,
Stakeholders, Strategies, 30 HuM. RTS. 2 (2003).
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explored in her past scholarship, environmental justice problems
generally lie at the intersection of environmental law, civil rights
law, and tort law, each of which engages a different aspect of the
problem. Environmental law typically focuses on violations of
minimum standards applicable to everyone, which many severe
environmental impacts will violate. Civil rights law engages the
disproportionate character of the harm, with particular
consideration of intentional discrimination against and disparate
impacts on low-income communities of color. Tort law addresses
the causation of harm in violation of a duty of care, and many
environmental justice problems involve negligence (unreasonable
conduct by the person or entity with the duty of care) or nuisance
(substantial and unreasonable interference with use or enjoyment
of land).6
In the context of offshore drilling and oil spills, a myriad of
other laws apply that intersect with the justice problem. For
example, the Department of Interior-through the Mineral
Management Service at the time of the spill and the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement
(BOEMRE) since the post-spill reorganization-and Coast Guard
apply a regulatory apparatus to drilling. The National
Commission's report makes clear that the way in which they
implemented their authority pre-spill, together with an inadequate
industry safety culture, increased the risks of a catastrophic
blowout (and its environmental justice impacts) and of oil rig
worker injury. Similarly, as discussed in Part II, the National
Contingency Plan used to respond to the spill, together with
environmental law, helped to frame choices regarding waste
8disposal and health with significant fairness implications. The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, among other laws, structures possibilities
for compensation, the focus of Part III.9 Laws regarding worker
training and safety, paired with the National Contingency Plan and
admiralty law, shaped the conditions of the workers and their
10
capacity to gain compensation, which Part IV explores. None of
6 See Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New
Model for International Environmental Rights, 24 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 71, 88-90
(2005).
7 See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 76-79.
8 See infra Part fl.
9 See infra Part III.
10 See infra Part IV.
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these laws has environmental justice as its primary focus, but all of
them frame the disproportionate distribution of risks and benefits
in the aftermath of the spill.
The difficulty of navigating substantive overlap to address
justice problems is made worse by the structural fragmentation that
accompanies these different legal regimes. Both offshore drilling
and oil spill responses involve a myriad of federal, state, and local
entities with specific responsibilities under the laws of these
regimes. These entities often try to coordinate their efforts. The
Department of Interior and Coast Guard work cooperatively in
their dual roles regulating offshore drilling, and the National
Contingency Plan ("NCP") provides a framework for an array of
key agencies to organize their efforts in response to spills. But
after the Deepwater Horizon spill, the bifurcated and sometimes
ambiguous divisions of authority also led to conflicts and actions
outside of the formal post-disaster decision-making structure.
States and localities at times used funds from BP to spread more
boom-a physical barrier to the oil-when they disagreed with the
federal government's decision to distribute it elsewhere. Ad hoc
subgroups of agencies made decisions about fishery closures and
dispersant use outside of the formal structure.11 Moreover, while
the federal agencies involved all have explicit environmental
justice obligations, as discussed in more depth in Part III,
implementing those obligations becomes harder in the kind of
multi-agency decision-making that took place in the aftermath of
the spill.
B. Transnational Energy Production and Consumption
These problems of both substantive and structural overlap are
made more difficult by the institutional and legal structure of
transnational energy production and consumption. This structure
ties corporations to national governments, makes them hard to
regulate effectively, and creates enormous pressure for greater
energy independence. Together, these dynamics put pressure on
the United States to exploit viable domestic sources of oil, a
pressure that means that deepwater drilling and its justice
implications will continue for the foreseeable future.
11 See Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REv. 1077 (2011), for an in-depth
analysis of these governance issues.
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Due to the international law principle of state sovereignty
over natural resources, corporations extracting oil around the
world must do so with approval of national governments. Many of
the countries with large oil supplies have governments with which
the United States has uneasy relations and/or that face significant
political instability.12 This legal framework has resulted in
significant environmental justice concerns associated with oil
extraction around the world. Economically powerful corporations
pair with governments wielding sovereign regulatory authority in
ways that limit the capacity of vulnerable populations to protect
their rights.13 Especially in the poorer countries in which oil
extraction takes place, but in the United States as well, these
dynamics result in patterns of governmental underenforcement of
environmental standards applicable to oil companies. Governments
often profit directly from the oil companies' efforts; in the U.S.
deepwater drilling context relevant to this article, the government
receives royalties from leasing underwater land and drilling rights
to oil companies.14 Moreover, in countries with significant armed
conflict or human rights violations, the relationship between the
corporation and the government at times involves the corporation
in that violence. 15
The people who face the greatest environmental risks and
harms as a result of this production do not receive its benefits. A
voluminous scholarly literature provides narratives of massive
environmental degradation intertwined with human suffering that
accompanies oil and other extractive industries around the world,16
12 See Robert Dufresne, The Opacity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal
Violence, and International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 331 (2004).
13 See id.
14 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to lease
oil and gas rights to the highest responsible qualified bidder).
15 See Dufresne, supra note 12, at 334-48; accord ECOLOGICAL RESISTANCE
MOVEMENTS: THE GLOBAL EMERGENCE OF RADICAL AND POPULAR
ENVIRONMENTALISM (Bron Raymond Taylor ed., 1995); MICHAEL T. KLARE,
RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT (2001); Rebecca
Hardin, Concessionary Politics in the Western Congo Basin: History and
Culture in Forest Use (World Res. Inst. Envtl. Governance in Afr. Working
Papers, Working Paper No. 6, 2002), available at http://pdf.wri.org/eaa-wp6.pdf.
16 Numerous books and articles have detailed the environmental and human
toll of the energy production process. See, e.g., IKE OKONTA & ORONTO
DOUGLAS, WHERE VULTURES FEAST: SHELL, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OIL IN THE
NIGER DELTA (2001); Monti Aguirre, The Chixoy Dam Destroyed Our Lives,
HUM. RTS. DIALOGUE, Spring 2004, at 20; Richard L. Ottinger, Energy and
Environmental Challenges for Developed and Developing Countries, 9 PACE
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as well as the unequal distribution of the burdens and benefits.17
This Article adds to this literature by detailing the ways in which
this unequal distribution is not simply a product of developing
countries with unstable dictators. While the domestic U.S. version
of environmental injustice stemming from the oil industry may be
less extreme, the patterns of powerful corporations influencing the
substance of law and enforcement in ways that put vulnerable
populations at risk and the more limited avenues open to these
impacted people are consistent with the rest of the world.
The treatment of governments and corporations under
international law and its incorporation in domestic legal systems
reinforces these difficulties. The international legal system is
premised on sovereign and equal states making agreements with
each other, whether through treaties or under customary
international law. Nation-states are the primary subjects and
objects of international law, while corporations, despite their
transnational reach, have limited international legal personality.18
While significant scholarship problematizes this structure and
suggests ways in which informal dynamics change it,19 the formal
ENVTL. L. REV. 55, 62-70 (1991); Douglas John Steding, Russian Floating
Nuclear Reactors: Lacunae in Current International Environmental and
Maritime Law and the Need for Proactive International Cooperation in the
Development of Sustainable Energy Sources, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 711,
718-21 (2004); Andrea Wang, China's Energy Policy and Competing
International Environmental Pressures, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
271, 273-75 (2001).
17 See Dufresne, supra note 12, at 348-63; Judith Kimerling, International
Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields: The Privatization of Environmental
Law, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 294-314 (2001); Stephen J. Kobrin, Oil and
Politics: Talisman Energy and Sudan, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 425 (2004).
18 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289-99
(5th ed. 1998); A.A. Fatouros, Introduction: Looking for an International Legal
Framework for Transnational Corporations, in 20 UNITED NATIONS LIBR. ON
TRANSNAT'L CORPS: TRANSN'L CORPS.: THE INT'L LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1, 17-18
(A.A. Fatouros ed., 1994).
19 See THE FLUID STATE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEMS (Hilary Charlesworth et al. eds., 2005); Becky Mansfield, Beyond
Rescaling: Reintegrating the 'National' as a Dimension of Scalar Relations, 29
PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 458 (2005) (arguing for the importance of
engaging the role of the national); Alexander B. Murphy, The Sovereign State
System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary
Considerations, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 81, 107 (Thomas
J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property
and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1293, 1318-19 (1996); Antonio F. Perez, Review Essay, Who Killed
Sovereignty? Or: Changing Norms Concerning Sovereignty in International
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legal system constitutes and regulates corporations primarily
through national and subnational law.2 0
This national and subnational regulation of corporations
becomes particularly problematic in situations like this one in
which a mass of subcontracting relationships complicate questions
of regulatory authority and liability. Another layer of multiscalar
law interacts with the above-described regulatory regime due to
the many corporations involved through subcontracting
relationships in the drilling project. While BP, as the company
with the oil and gas lease from the U.S. government, is the
legally responsible party for the spill, eleven other companies with
ties to multiple countries (if one counts subsidiaries as distinct
companies from their parents) had significant involvement in BP's
drilling efforts at the Macondo well site.22 Under the Outer
Continental Shelves Land Act, Louisiana law incorporated as
Law, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 463 (1996). For examples of different conceptual
approaches to international law and the role of informal interactions in
international lawmaking, see Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process,
75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government
Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041 (2003); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law,
43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of
Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-
Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1823 (2002); Brett
Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 BuFF. L.
REV. 679 (2003); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004);
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law and State Socialization:
Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, 54 DUKE L.J. 983 (2005);
Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005). For an overview of several
leading approaches, see FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
(Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2005).
20 See 20 UNITED NATIONS LIBR. ON TRANSNAT'L CORPS: TRANSN'LCORPS.:
THE INT'L LEGAL FRAMEWORK (A.A. Fatouros ed., 1994); 19 UNITED NATIONS
LIBR. ON TRANSNAT'L CORPS: TRANSN'L CORPS. AND NAT'L L. (Seymour J.
Rubin & Don Wallace, Jr. eds., 1994); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Architecture
of American Corporate Law: Facilitation and Regulation, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J.
167 (2005).
21 See BP, DEEPWATER HORIZON ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT 15
(Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.bp.com/liveassetsfbp-internet/globalbp/
globalbp-ukenglishincident-response/STAGING/localassets/downloads-pdfs
/Deepwater Horizon AccidentInvestigationReport.pdf [hereinafter BP
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT].
22 See Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill, supra note 11, at 1084-86.
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federal law governs these subcontracting relationships, but the
entities themselves and the choices that they make present a
complex geography of regulatory relationships. For example, the
Deepwater Horizon rig was registered under a Marshall Islands
flag, giving the Marshall Islands partial regulatory authority under
24the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Together, these substantive and structural complexities create
formidable barriers to justice. The following three Parts detail how
these dynamics played out in the specific context of the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. They demonstrate the ways in which
justice hinges on a myriad of particular decisions regarding many
different laws and regulations and in which the types of problems
articulated in this Part manifest through situational details.
II. JUSTICE CONCERNS WITH THE SPILL RESPONSE
This Part analyzes environmental justice concerns regarding
the spill response, with a focus on the disproportionate distribution
of oil spill waste and of current and future public health risks
associated with the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on low-
income communities of color. The first Section examines the legal
framework that governs the disposal of oil spill waste in municipal
facilities, the environmental justice concerns raised by the
distribution of such facilities, and the actual disproportionate
dumping of oil spill waste in low-income communities of color.
The second Section considers the inadequate access to health care,
higher rates of exposure, and uncertain plans for long-term health
surveillance that frame - additional fairness concerns in the
aftermath of the spill.
A. Waste Disposal
By December 2011, the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill had
23 See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006); Fruge ex rel. Fruge v. Parker
Drilling Co., 337 F.3d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 2003). For applicable Louisiana law,
see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4807 (2010); Continental Cas. Co. v.
Associated Pipe & Supply Co., 310 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd in part,
modified in part, and vacated in part on other grounds, 447 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.
1971).
24 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 217; David Hammer, Kenner Hearing: Marshall
Islands-Flagged Rig in Gulf Oil Spill Was. Reviewed in February, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (May 12, 2010, 4:27 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-
spill/index.ssf/2010/05/kennerhearing-marshallisland.html.
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resulted in over 113,000 tons of solid waste and 1,408,000 barrels
of liquid waste. The waste falls into five main categories: oily
liquids (459,781 oil barrels), liquids (951,866 oil barrels), oily
solids (96,842.80 tons), solid waste (13,961.90 tons), and
recyclables (4,775.90 tons).25 This immense amount of waste
required facilities for disposal, oil recovery, and recycling. BP
identified numerous facilities located throughout the Gulf Coast
region to handle the volume of waste being generated as part of the
cleanup effort, primaril6 located in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, and Florida. Additionally, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Coast Guard approved
waste management plans outlining how the waste would be
managed in each state.27 The plans took into account "applicable
federal, state, and local regulations; planning for waste
characterization; and BP's proposed locations for waste
management activities in order to consider the suitability of
specific sites and the impacts on the surrounding communities."2 8
Although BP and the governmental agencies explicitly
included environmental justice concerns in their plans, leading
environmental justice expert Robert Bullard raised concerns early
on about the disproportionate siting of waste storage in low-
income communities of color.29 This Section examines the way in
which law interacted with these environmental justice concerns. It
begins by examining the applicability and operation of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the nation's
primary law governing the disposal of solid and hazardous waste
in this context.30 RCRA addresses the duties imposed on the EPA
as the federal agency charged with regulating waste management.
25 Weekly Waste Tracking Cumulative Report by Disposal Facility BP (July
1, 2012), . http://usresponse.bp.com/external/content/document/
2911/1488907/I/Waste-Oil-Recovery-and-Disposal-Summary-Report.pdf.
26 Waste disposal and recoverable facilities (current and potential
locations), BP (Mar. 7, 2011), http://usresponse.bp.com/go/doc/2911/962795/
Location-of-staging-areas-and-landfill-disposal-facilities.
27 Waste Management on the Gulf Coast, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/waste.html (last updated Oct. 14, 2011).
28 Id.
29 Robert D. Bullard, BP's Waste Management Plan Raises Environmental
Justice Concerns, DISSIDENT VOICE, (July 29, 2010, 7:59 AM),
http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/07/bp%E2%80%99s-waste-management-plan-
raises-environmental-justice-concerns/.
30 History of RCRA, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
epawaste/laws-regs/rcrahistory.htm (last updated July 16, 2012).
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It then examines the obligations stemming from Executive Order
12,898, which directs federal agencies to make environmental
justice part of their mission.31 While RCRA focuses on the broad
waste regulations affecting human health and the environment,
Executive Order 12,898 applies to specific EPA decisions that
impact low-income communities and communities of color. By
together addressing the impacts of waste management on humans
and the environment, RCRA and Executive Order 12,898 play a
pivotal role in establishing the legal framework surrounding the
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill waste management plans for
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida.
1. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
For the last thirty-four years, RCRA has served as the nation's
primar law governing the disposal of solid and hazardous
waste. RCRA aims to protect human health and the environment
by ensuring proper management of wastes.33 It directs the EPA to
develop regulations governing the identification and management
of hazardous and nonhazardous waste.34
RCRA incorporates two waste management programs to
further its goal of protecting human health and the environment.
The first program is the Solid Waste Program under RCRA
Subtitle D. 35 This program "encourages states to develop
comprehensive plans to manage nonhazardous industrial solid
waste and municipal solid waste.,,36 Subtitle D sets criteria for
municipal solid waste landfills and other solid waste disposal
facilities. The second important program under RCRA is the
37Hazardous Waste Program under Subtitle C. This program
"establishes a system for controlling hazardous waste from the
time it is generated until its ultimate disposal."38 Through Subtitle
C and Subtitle D, RCRA seeks to protect human health and the
environment by sequestering hazardous waste and regulating
municipal and industrial waste facilities.
31 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
32 History of RCRA, supra note 30.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
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Solid wastes are classified as "hazardous" or "nonhazardous"
depending on their characteristics. RCRA defines hazardous
wastes as those which pose a substantial or potential hazard to
human health or the environment when improperly managed and
divides them into two categories: listed wastes and characteristic
wastes. Listed wastes are considered hazardous if they appear on
one of the four hazardous waste lists established by EPA
39
regulations. Characteristic wastes have one or more of the
following properties: ignitability, corrosive characteristics,
reactivity, or toxicity.4 0
The Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) program under 40
C.F.R. Part 268 typically governs hazardous solid waste
41disposal. LDR mandates treatment standards specific to each
type of hazardous waste. It requires that, rather than being diluted,
hazardous waste be4 properly treated and then disposed of, not
stored indefinitely. In general, hazardous waste facilities
incorporate strict land disposal restrictions, treatment
requirements, and a zero discharge system.43 The public health
concerns surrounding hazardous wastes, coupled with the risk of
leaching from landfills, legally prevents municipal solid waste
landfills from accepting hazardous solid waste.
Nonhazardous wastes, on the other hand, are waste substances
that are not ignitable, corrosive, reactive, or toxic. However,
RCRA also provides strict regulatory requirements for these
wastes to prevent environmental or public health problems. It
limits nonhazardous solid waste disposal to approved industrial or
municipal solid waste landfills. These landfills do not accept
hazardous solid waste but can accept household waste,
nonhazardous sludge, industrial solid waste, and construction and
demolition debris. The EPA enforces stringent design standards
for municipal solid waste landfills to protect nearby groundwater
39 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 261 (2012).
40 Hazardous Waste Regulations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/epawastellaws-regs/regs-haz.htm (last updated July. 16,
2012).
41 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTRODUCTION TO LAND DISPOSAL
RESTRICTIONS (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/wastes/inforesources/
pubs/training/1dr05.pdf.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Landfills, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/
municipal/landfill.htm (last updated July 16, 2012).
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and soil from leaching toxic waste in the landfill. These landfills
must comply with the federal regulations in 40 C.F.R. Part 258, or
equivalent state regulations.45
Although most hazardous waste is classified as a listed or
characteristic hazardous waste, there are several exemptions under
Subtitle C. For purposes of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,
the most significant exemption is oil and gas exploration and
production (E&P) waste.46 The E&P exemption is codified at 40
C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(5) and exempts wastes that have been generated
from a material or process uniquely associated with the
exploration, development, or production of crude oil and gas.47 As
a result, the oily solid waste generated by the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill is categorically excluded from being labeled
hazardous. The oily solid waste includes oil-soaked containment
booms, oil-contaminated debris, oil-contaminated soils, tar balls,
tar patties, and oil-contaminated vegetative debris.48 These types
of waste are officially categorized as E&P Type 16 waste: Crude
Oil Spill Cleanup Waste. This exemption allows oil and gas
operators to choose a waste management and disposal option that
is less stringent than what is typically required under RCRA
Subtitle C. The exemption therefore has a significant impact on
the oil and gas industry because it reduces the overall cost
associated with drilling.
Despite this E&P exemption, the EPA has stated that "the
exemption does not mean these wastes could not present a hazard
to human health or the environment if improperly managed." As
noted above, the exemption only applies to wastes generated from
the "exploration, development, or production of crude oil."
45 Id.
46 Crude Oil and Natural Gas Waste, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/special/oill (last updated July 16,
2012).
47 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EXEMPTION OF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION
AND PRODUCTION WASTES FROM FEDERAL HAZARDOUS WASTES REGULATIONS
5-6 (2002), available at www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industriallspecial/oilloil-
gas.pdf.
48 BP, HOUMA INCIDENT COMMAND WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN (2010),
available at
http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/waste/r6_waste-plan kmr20100615_1524.pdf.
49 Id.
50 U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 47, at 5.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 6.
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Hence, wastes generated from the transportation of crude oil are
not exempt from RCRA and can be treated as hazardous waste
53
when disposed. The EPA has acknowledged that if E&P wastes
are not prope5r treated, they present risks to human health and the
environment. Specifically, when the EPA sampled oil and gas
wastes, it found that "organic pollutants at level of potential
concern ... included the hydrocarbons benzene and
phenantherene. Inorganic constituents at levels of potential
concern included lead, arsenic, barium, antimony, fluoride, and
,,55uranium.
As a result of the E&P exemption for RCRA Subtitle C, the
oil-soaked containment booms, oil-contaminated debris, oil-
contaminated soils, tar balls, tar patties, and oil-contaminated
vegetative debris from the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill were
disposed of in Subtitle D municipal solid waste landfills in Gulf
56Coast communities. Over 96,000 tons of this type of waste were
generated in the six months following the oil spill and the Gulf
Coast municipal landfills received the majority of it.5 7 In August
2010, BP stated that "oily solids from spill response activities have
been collected and characterized. To date, analytical results have
confirmed these materials do not exhibit hazardous waste
characteristics., 58 However, BP also observed that, even without
the analytical results, "federal and state regulations exempt most of
these materials from the definition of hazardous waste due to the
exploration and production exemption.',59
BP and the EPA worked cooperatively to ensure that the
waste was stored safely in these municipal landfills and appear to
53 Id.
54 Crude Oil and Natural Gas Waste: Regulatory Determination for Oil, Gas,
and Geothermal Exploration, Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg.
25,446 (July 6, 1988).
55 Id. at 25,448.
56 HOUMA INCIDENT COMMAND WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 48,
at 4.
57 BP, WEEKLY WASTE TRACKING CUMULATIVE REPORT BY DISPOSAL
FACILITY: REPORT FOR THE WEEK OF 12/19/2011 TO 12/31/2011 (2011), available
at
http://usresponse.bp.com/external/content/document/2911/1270763/i/Consolidat
edWeeklyReport_12311 1Disposal%2OFacility.pdf.
58 BP, WASTE SAMPLING: WASTE STREAM IDENTIFICATION AND
CHARACTERIZATION 2 (2010), available at http://www.epa.govfbpspill/
waste/bp-wastestreamid.pdf.
59 Id.
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have followed appropriate regulatory procedures.60 However,
perhaps in part due to the unequal distribution of landfills in the
United States, people of color are disproportionately bearing the
burden of these very large quantities of oily solid waste. While
people of color make up just 26% of the coastal counties in
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana, Professor Robert
Bullard found that 55.4% of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
waste was dumped in communities that are comprised
predominantly of people of color. In addition, he noted that
"[m]ore than 80 percent of the oil waste was disposed in
communities where the percent people of color exceeded the
percent in the county."61 Two landfills received close to half of the
waste, both of which had more people of color living nearby than
the percentages of people of color in the region as a whole:
(1) Springhill Landfill in Campelton, Florida: 24,247.4 tons
dumped, while 76% of the residents living within a one-mile
radius are people of color; and
(2) Allied Waste Colonial Landfill in Sorrento, Louisiana:
22,704.8'tons dumped, while 34.7% of the residents living within a
one-mile radius are people of color.62
This disproportionate burden poses future risks for these
communities. The E&P hazardous waste exemption has
contributed to oil spill waste management plans that do not fully
take into account the potential long-term effects of these very large
quantities of oily solid waste on public health and the environment.
The waste management plans for Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama
and Florida rely on the E&P hazardous waste exemption, and
accordin 1 direct oily solid waste to municipal solid waste
landfills. Although sampling and analysis confirms that most of
60 BP, MOBILE INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
PLAN (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/waste/r4_waste-plan.pdf.
61 Robert D. Bullard, Targeted Environmental Justice Enforcement Needed
in EPA Region 4, DISSIDENT VOICE, (Nov. 29, 2010, 7:00 AM),
http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/l1 /targeted-environmental-justice-enforcement-
needed-in-epa-region-4/.
62 WEEKLY WASTE TRACKING CUMULATIVE REPORT, supra note 57; Robert
D. Bullard, BP's Waste Management Plan Raises Environmental Justice
Concerns, DISSIDENT VOICE (July 29, 2010, 7:59 AM),
http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/07/bp%E2%80%99s-waste-management-plan-
raises-environmental-justice-concerns/ (racial composition statistics).
63 HOUMA INCIDENT COMMAND WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 48;
MOBILE INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra
note 60.
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the waste does not exhibit hazardous waste characteristics now,64
the waste management plans do not contemplate the future risks
associated with the disposing of 96,279 tons of oily solid waste in
65
municipal solid waste landfills. Moreover, even if the waste
remains safe, it is unfair for this waste to be disproportionately
stored close to where people of color live.
2. Executive Order 12,898: "Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income
Populations"
Executive Orders are legally binding directives to federal
administrative agencies. On February 11, 1994, President Clinton
signed Executive Order 12,898 directing administrative agencies to
66
make environmental justice part of their missions. Executive
Order 12,898 directs each administrative agency to "make
environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies,
and activities on minority populations and low-income
,67populations." As part of this order, President Clinton directed the
implementation of an Interagency Working Group to provide
guidance to federal agencies in their efforts to eliminate
disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects on minority populations and low-income
68populations. The Executive Order further directed the
development of an agency-wide environmental justice strategy,
and agencies were mandated to perform research, data collection,
and analysis to ensure that their programs did not adversely affect
minority and low-income populations.69 In President Clinton's
memorandum addressing Executive Order 12,898, he highlighted
that the purpose of the Order was to "promote nondiscrimination in
Federal programs substantially affecting human health and the
environment, and to provide minority communities access to
public information on, and an opportunity for public participation
64 BP, WASTE SAMPLING, supra note 58, at 2.
65 WEEKLY WASTE TRACKING CUMULATIVE REPORT, supra note 57, at 1.
66 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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70in, matters relating to human health and the environment." .
Executive Order 12,898 directs the EPA to make
environmental justice part of its mission. Additionally, the EPA's
Environmental Justice Strategy, adopted pursuant to Executive
Order 12,898, acknowledged that "partnering with communities
with minority low-income populations which may be suffering
from disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects should be a cornerstone of EPA's pollution
prevention efforts."7 1
The Obama Administration is enforcing Executive Order
12,898 and making environmental justice an important part of its
overall strategy to protect human health and the environment. The
EPA's current "Plan EJ 2014" has three main goals: (1) protect
health in communities over-burdened by pollution, (2) empower
communities to take action to improve their health and
environment, and (3) establish partnerships with local, state, tribal,
and federal organizations to achieve healthy and sustainable
communities.72 In July 2010, the EPA published Interim Guidance
on Considering Environmental Justice During. Development of an
Action. When finalized, the guide will be used as a tool to help
EPA officials conider environmental justice throughout the
rulemaking process.
One area of law that provides the EPA with broad discretion
to consider environmental justice is the regulation of vaste
disposal under RCRA. 74 The EPA establishes the requirements
applicable to the treatment, storage and disposal of waste "as ma
be necessary to protect human health and the environment.'
Therefore, in the context of waste management in the wake of the
70 EPA Insight Policy Paper: Executive Order #12898 on Environmental
Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/fedfac/
documents/executive-order_12898.htm (last updated Nov. 9, 2011).
71 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY'S ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY (1995), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/ej-strategy 1995.pdf.
72 Plan EJ 2014, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/ej/plan-ejl (last updated June 19, 2012).
73 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERING
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DURING DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTION (2010),
available at www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/considering-ej-in-
rulemaking-guide-07-2010.pdf.
74 Id. at 5.
75 Id.
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BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, the EPA has the duty to consider
the environmental justice impacts of its decisions.
Executive Order 12,898 directs the EPA to consider whether
particular communities will be negatively impacted by the waste
management plans adopted in response to the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill. The EPA acknowledges that an essential
element of environmental justice is fair treatment of all people.
"Fair treatment means that no group of people should bear a
disproportionate burden of environmental harms and risks."7 6
However, the small number of communities taking the majority of
the oily solid waste shoulders a larger share of the burdens and
risks associated with the Gulf oil spill cleanup effort.
The EPA also acknowledges that environmental justice
77
requires the meaningful involvement of all people. However, due
to the emergency situation created by the Gulf oil spill, there was
little opportunity to truly have "meaningful involvement" from
communities that were impacted by the ultimate waste disposal
plans. Although the EPA and BP sponsored community meetings
in various sites throughout the region, the emergency situation
created by the spill did not provide the public with an opportunity
to influence the EPA or BP when making decisions about waste
78disposal facilities. Most importantly, the emergency timeframe
precluded decision-makers from making meaningful efforts to seek
out and facilitate involvement with community members living
near the landfills.
In its waste management plans, BP refers to making decisions
about disposal facilities that take environmental justice concerns
79into account. Specifically, BP's Houma Waste Management Plan
states that planning should include "analysis of socio-economic
demographic data within close proximity to operations, evaluation
of any potential impacts on sensitive populations, [and] evaluation
of any pre-existing community concerns and regulatory
76 Id. at 3.
77 Id.
78 Community Outreach, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/BPSpill/community.html (last updated Oct. 14, 2011)
(relevant community meetings mostly took place after relevant waste disposal
decisions had been made).
79 HOUMA INCIDENT COMMAND WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 48,
at 6.
1192012]
N. Y. U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
enforcement history." 80 Also, BP noted that it would demonstrate
"a strong commitment to address environmental justice challenges
and the disproportionate environmental burdens place on low
income communities as required by applicable legal
requirements."8 1
However, the disproportionate burden on the towns of
Campelton and Sorrento, which received close to half of the oil
spill waste, raises questions about whether the governmental
supervision adequately addressed environmental justice. As noted
above, both landfills are located in areas that have a higher
percentage of people of color than the region as a whole, and the
area near Campelton's landfill-which received the most waste-
is over three-quarters people of color. This concern is reinforced
by what took place when at least one community in Mississippi
that was designated to receive waste attempted to opt out. Despite
regulators disapproving of that opt out, the community was
allowed to provide waste staging ground rather than storage after
their efforts.82 Low-income communities of color like Campelton
may not have been aware or organized enough to raise similar
concerns about the disproportionate burden they are assuming.
Moreover, these concerns about communities having unequal
capacity to resist in this context arise in a broader context of
unequal siting of these kinds of waste disposal. The decision to
place this waste in municipal land dumps exacerbates the
environmental justice problem caused by the disproportionate
siting of these types of disposal facilities in low-income
communities and communities of color. 3
In sum, both the EPA and BP are aware of environmental
justice concerns and attempted to implement strategies to protect
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1L
82 See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 170; see also supra
notes 61-62 and accompanying text. The area around the landfill that tried to opt
out, Pecan Grove Landfill, has a minority population of only 12.5% immediately
surrounding the landfill. Bullard, BP's Waste Management Plan Raises
Environmental Justice Concerns, supra note 62.
83 For an analysis of structural racism and the citing of industrial facilities,
see Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice and Entrepreneurship: Pitfalls for the
Unwary, 31 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 601 (2009). For a discussion of efforts to
address dumping of toxic waste in low-income, communities of color, see Dollie
Burwell & Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Comes Full Circle: Warren
County Before and After, I GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 9 (2007).
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low-income communities and communities of color in applying
RCRA to waste disposal in the aftermath of this spill.
Nevertheless, some of the communities negatively impacted by the
waste disposal of oily solid waste have high populations of low-
income residents and people of color. While Executive Order
12,898 was not completely disregarded by the EPA, it was not
given its full effect.
B. Health
Gulf Coast residents experience the health impacts of the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill through consumption of seafood,
increased air pollution, and exposure to contaminants on beaches
and in the water. In response to the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric (NOAA), the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), and the EPA launched a joint
surveillance effort to test seafood, close waters contaminated with
oil to fishing, and prevent contaminated seafood from reaching the
84
market. Seafood is tested for "taint," petroleum odors, and
unsafe levels of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), a ty%
of potentially carcinogenic chemical that is found in oil.
According to the FDA, the chemical dispersants used to clean oil
from the water are unlikely to contaminate seafood or harm human
health, but seafood that has likely been exposed to dispersants is
also being monitored.8 6
People living close to the Gulf Coast may have been exposed
to particulate matter (PM) from the burning of oil by cleanup
workers, or to low levels of chemicals from oil in the air.
Exposure to PM may exacerbate chronic conditions such as heart
disease or asthma and chemicals in the air can cause irritation of
the eyes, nose, throat, and skin.8 8 Gulf Coast residents are also at
risk of exposure to oil and dispersants on beaches or while
swimming through direct skin contact.89 Exposure may result in
84 Overview of Testing Protocol to Re-open Harvest Waters that Were
Closed in Response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (July 15, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/Food/ucm2l7598.htm.
85 Id.
86 id.
87 What to Expect from the Oil Spill and How to Protect Your Health, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://emergency.cdc.gov/
gulfoilspill201O0/whatto-expect.asp (last visited July 21, 2012).
8 8 Id.
89 Id.
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dermatitis secondary skin infections, rashes, or other types of
irritation.
The BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster ma; also cause
or exacerbate mental and behavioral health problems. Disasters
lead to an increase in anxiety, post-traumatic stress, and other
mental health disorders, and the prevalence and severity of mental
illnesses are directly correlated to the severity of the disaster.9 2
After Hurricane Katrina, a mental health study in New Orleans
revealed a marked increase in anxiety and related mental health
disorders; the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill impacts many of
the same communities that survived the hurricane, and studies
since the spill indicate that some residents are struggling with a
second wave of stress and trauma that could exacerbate existing
mental health problems.93 However, as discussed further in Part
IV.B.1, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility specifically excludes
compensation for mental health problems resulting from the
spill.
Studies of past oil spills also reveal resulting mental health
problems. Psychological studies conducted a year after the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill in 1989 found higher rates of anxiety, depression,
and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among people who were
exposed to the spill, and Native Americans were found to be
particularly vulnerable to depression after the spill. According to
the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and studies published in the New England Journal of
Medicine, some mental health impacts of the BP Deepwater
96Horizon Oil Spill have already been observed. For example, the
90 Gina M. Solomon & Sarah Janssen, Commentary, Health Effects of the
Gulf Oil Spill, 304 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1118 (2010).
91 Id.
92 Sandro Galea et al., Exposure to Hurricane-Related Stressors and Mental
Illness After Hurricane Katrina, 64 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1427 (2007);
Bernard D. Goldstein et al., Review Article, The Gulf Oil Spill, 364 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1334 (2011); Katherine Yun et al., Perspective, Moving Mental Health into
the Disaster-Preparedness Spotlight, 363 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1193 (2010).
93 Id.
94 See infra note 152.
95 Lawrence A. Palinkas et al., Community Patterns of Psychiatric Disorders
After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1517 (1993).
96 See RAY MABUS, AMERICA'S GULF COAST: A LONG TERM RECOVERY
PLAN AFTER THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 52 (2010), available at
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/gulf-recovery-
sep-2010.pdf; sources cited supra note 92.
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National Domestic Violence Hotline received a 13% increase in
calls from Gulf Coast states between April 2010 and June 2010,
including a 21% increase in calls from Louisiana residents.9 7
The disproportionate health impacts of the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill present a unique challenge when viewed in the
legal landscape. Rather than providing for prevention of
disproportionate impacts and care for those suffering long-term
health impacts, the legal regime structuring oil spill response
focuses primarily on cleanup and compensation, areas that are
discussed in detail in Part IV. Applicable environmental law
focuses on the protection and restoration of natural resources.
Neither area sufficiently addresses environmental justice issues.
While enforcement of existing law may help to address some
health impacts of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, new
strategies are necessary to prevent disproportionate harm to low-
income communities and communities of color. This Section
explores existing legal strategies for preventing and addressing
disproportionate health impacts caused by the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill. Specifically, the Section analyzes the interaction
between the National Contingency Plan, which coordinates oil
spill response efforts, and the above-discussed Executive Order
12,898.
Passed in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) amended the Clean Water Act
(CWA), authorizing the President to create a National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (National
Conti ency Plan or NCP) to coordinate the federal response to oil
spills. The NCP establishes criteria and procedures to ensure
immediate federal. response to any discharge "that results in a
substantial threat to the public health or welfare of the United
States." 99 Under the NCP, duties are assigned to federal
departments and agencies in coordination with the states.100 Coast
Guard strike teams are organized to coordinate response, a system
of surveillance and notice is established to identify oil discharges,
97 Id.
98 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (2006 & Supp. VI 2012); see also CURRY L.
HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41262,
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL .SPILL: SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7 (2010),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf.
99 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(I).
100 Id. § 1321(d)(2)(A).
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and oil removal techniques are identified.101 Regulations of the
NCP requiring oil spill response actions are binding and
102
enforceable under the OPA and the CWA. The President is
authorized to revise or amend the NCP as needed. 103 Thus, the
NCP has significant authority to address environmental harms by
requiring specific response actions, and the President has the
capacity to modify the NCP to require more effective response
mechanisms or coordination as needed.
The NCP establishes a National Response System (NRS)
104
consisting of multiple agencies and strategies. The NRS is made
up of a National Response Team (NRT) headed by the Coast
Guard; Regional Response Teams (RRTs) comprised of regional
representatives of each NRT member agency, local governments,
and state governments; Area Committees (ACs) comprised of
"qualified personnel from federal, state, and local agencies," who
develop Area Contingency Plans; and an On Scene Coordinator
(OSC), generally a Coast Guard captain, who coordinates response
activities and determines the level of cleanup required. Area
Committees must prepare and submit Area Contingency Plans
(ACPs) to the President, detailing an adequate an to remove oil
and protect natural resources, fish, and wildlife. Thus, the NCP
constitutes a detailed, multi-agency coordinated response to oil
spills with the authority to mandate specific actions on local and
national levels.
Executive Order 12,898, described in depth in the preceding
Section, is applicable to the National Contingency Plan via the
various federal agencies involved in oil spill response. National
Response Team member agencies include, among others, HHS,
EPA, and NOAA, each of which is coordinating response activities
related to health impacts of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill.' 07
Agency environmental justice strategies are relevant to the BP
101 id. § 1321(d)(2)(C)-(F).
102 HAGERTY & RAMSEUR, supra note 98, at 8.
103 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(3).
104 HAGERTY & RAMSEUR, supra note 98, at 8.
105 Id. at 8-9.
106 33 U.S.C.§ 1321(j)(4).
107 Member Agencies, U.S. NAT'L RESPONSE TEAM, http://nrt.org/
production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/MADispForm?Openform (last visited July 21,
2012).
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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill response efforts for several reasons.
First, existing strategies may provide guidance to NRT member
agencies and to the NRT as a whole for addressing environmental
justice concerns related to increasing public participation in agency
activities, health research and data collection, and identifying
communities that rely on subsistence use of natural resources such
as seafood. For example, HHS has identified strategies to improve
health surveillance, identify environmental hazards that most
impact communities of color and low-income communities, and
educate communities about health risks through community-based
108
outreach and training. If these strategies have been well-
implemented within HHS, and if they are well-tailored to the
specific demands of oil spill response activities, they may serve as
a model for responding to health impacts caused by the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
Second, Executive Order 12,898's direction to federal
agencies to "promote enforcement of all health and environmental
statutes in areas with minority populations and low-income
populations" is particularly relevant in cases where such
communities have experienced contamination of swimming water,109beaches, and subsistence seafood. For example, as discussed in
detail below, EPA can file suit to enforce CWA prohibitions on
unlawful pollution and other applicable environmental laws. 10
Finally, Executive Order 12,898 is relevant to BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill agency response activities because it is binding
on all federal agencies. Therefore, each agency involved in
response activities should consider whether such activities
disproportionately impact  low-income communities or
communities of color.
While each federal agency member of the NRT and the ACs
is directed to address environmental justice implications of its
activities, it is unclear how Executive Order 12,898 applies to the
NRT or the ACs as bodies, because these entities also include state
108 DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STRATEGIC ELEMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1995), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
ej/resources/publications/interagency/hhs-strategy-1995.pdf.
109 Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-103(a), 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7630 (Feb. 16,
1994).
110 See infra III.D.2.
I 1 1 See Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 6-604.
112 Seeid.at§1-101.
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and local governments.11 The NCP does not mention
environmental justice, which could lead to a gap in analysis of
disproportionate impacts in the context of NCP-mandated response
114
activities. Even though multiple NRT member agencies are
coordinating to address health impacts, the NCP contains no
specific provisions related to addressing or preventing
disproportionate health impacts; rather, it addresses health
concerns more broadly.15 While the OPA gives the President
authority to ensure immediate federal response to an oil spill
substantially affecting the public health and to activate the NCP
through multiple federal and state agencies, the OPA does not
specify that the NCP focus on inequality in public health concerns
116
arising from a spill. Likewise, the OPA mandates that ACs
prepare detailed plans for protection of fish and wildlife, but
117
without an explicit environmental justice focus.
This intersectionality raises the question of whether or not
application of Executive Order 12,898 to individual agency actions
is sufficient in the context of a multi-agency (and multi-
government) coordinated response effort. Some agencies are clear
about their consideration of environmental justice issues related to
at least some response activities. For example, the EPA established
a Cooperative Agreement grant program to provide funding and
technical assistance to local organizations working on
environmental justice issues resulting from the BP Deepwater
118Horizon Oil Spill. On the other hand, as discussed in the
preceding Section, the EPA did not give full effect to its
environmental justice strategies in relationship to waste
management decisions, which have disproportionately affected
communities of color.119 The NOAA Damage Assessment
Remediation and Restoration Program, which works with natural
resource trustees in Gulf Coast states to determine the extent of
damage to fish and other natural resources, requires trustees to
113 HAGERTY & RAMSEUR, supra note 98, at 8-9.
114 See 40 C.F.R. § 300 (2012).
t 15 See id.
116 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2) (2006 & Supp. VI 2012).
117 See id. § 1321(d)(2)(M).
118 Cooperative Agreements to Support Communities Affected by the BP Oil
Spill, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliancelej/grants/bp-
spill-grants.htmi (last updated May 24, 2012).
119 See supra Part II.A.
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consider whether communities of color or low-income
communities will be disproportionately impacted by its restoration
120
activities. While HHS has agency-wide environmental justice
strategies that apply to all of its efforts, information about its
application of those strategies to its BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill response is not publicly available.121 Thus, the multi-agency
structure of the response generally and with respect to health in
particular poses environmental justice concerns.
III. JUSTICE CONCERNS WITH COMPENSATION
One of the most pressing questions facing victims after the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill revolves around the issue of how to
make victims whole in the wake of damage suffered. This Part
explores the environmental justice dimensions of efforts to provide
compensation for victims of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
It first describes the framework created by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, and then explores environmental justice issues regarding the
Gulf Coast Claims Facility, governmental distribution of funds,
and litigation.
A. Oil Pollution Act and Compensation
In the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster and the protracted
litigation that followed, the OPA established liability guidelines
for responsible parties in the event of an unlawful discharge of
122
oil. The OPA imposes liability on parties responsible for "a
vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses
the substantial threat of a discharge of oil." Responsible parties
include "the lessee or permitee of the area in which the facility is
located or the holder of a right of use and easement granted
under .. . the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act . . . for the area in
which the facility is located . . . ."124 The source of the discharge,
and as a result the responsible party, is to be designated by the
President "where possible and appropriate," pursuant to OPA §
2714. 125
120 DARRP: About Relevant Laws, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOsPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/about/laws.htm#12898 (last updated July 19, 2010).
121 See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 108.
122 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-62 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
123 Id. § 2702(a).
124 Id. § 2701(32).
125 Id. § 2714.
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The OPA imposes affirmative duties on responsible parties.
These parties are responsible for costs associated with removal of
the oil, as well as specified damages caused by the unlawful
discharge.126 They must compensate for impairment of natural
resources, damage to real and personal property, the incapacitation
of subsistence resource users, lost tax revenues derived from
damaged resources in their various forms, lost profits derived from
said resources, and public services which suffer as a result of the
discharge.127 The conference report on the OPA states that "[tihe
claimant need not be the owner of the damaged property or
resources to recover for lost profits or income."1  States are able
to impose liability provisions in addition to those provided for in
the OPA in the case of discharge or removal within state limits.
Responsible parties are required to begin advertising detailed
claimant information within fifteen days of the incident, and must
maintain these advertisements for at least thirty days.' 30
Advertisements are to specify the availability of "interim, short-
term damages representing less than the full amount of damages to
which the claimant ultimately may be entitled," and that
acceptance of these payments will not preclude the claimant from
engaging in subsequent legal action to recover "damages not
reflected in the paid or settled partial claim." 13 1
These short-term OPA payments are intended to be expedited
in nature. "The responsible party shall establish a procedure for the
payment or settlement of a claim for interim, short-term damages.
Payment ... representing less than the full amount of damages to
which the claimant ultimately may be entitled shall not preclude
recovery by the claimant for damages not reflected ... .12 Under
§ 2710, indemnification agreements are allowed, but they do not
transfer liability from the responsible party to any other party.' 33
Regardless of indemnification, payment of "final damages ...
shall not foreclose a claimant's right to recovery of all damages to
126 Id. § 2702(b).
127 Id.
128 H.R. REP. No. 101-653, at 4 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 781.
129 33 U.S.C. § 2718.
130 Id. § 2714(b)(1).
131 Id. § 2714(b)(2).
132 Id. § 2705(a).
133 Id. § 2710.
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which the claimant otherwise is entitled under this Act or under
any other law."
134
The OPA serves to define the parameters of liability for
responsible parties. If the discharge can be shown to be solely the
result of an act of God, an act of war, or the act of "gross
negligence or willful misconduct" by a party other than the
initially designated entities, liability will either not be imposed, or
will be imposed upon those responsible for negligence or
misconduct.
If unlawful discharge occurs at an "offshore facility" like the
Deepwater Horizon, the responsible party is liable for all removal
costs, and an additional $75 million. If discharge occurs
onshore or in a deepwater port the responsible party's damages
are capped at $350 million. 1 3  These liability limits are to be
adjusted for changes in the Consumer Price Index at least every
three years, but remain at the aforementioned levels today. OPA
provisions also do not provide for the recovery of punitive
damages.139 Liability caps disperse only after a high burden of
proof has been met. For instance, if the discharge was proximately
caused by the "gross negligence or willful misconduct" of the
responsible party, or if the responsible party violated "an
applicable Federal safety, construction, or operating regulation,"
liability caps would not apply.140 The same would be true if the
party failed to report the incident, to cooperate with authorities, or
to comply with a lawful order.)4
There is a three year limit on damage claims from the time
"the injury and its connection with the discharge in question were
reasonably discoverable . . . ."142 Claims must first be brought to
the responsible party, and if the responsible party denies the claim
in full, or if the claim is not resolved within ninety days of
134 Id. § 2715(b)(2).
135 Id. § 2702(d); id. § 2703.
136 Id. § 2704(a)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV).
137 Id. § 2704(a)(4).
138 Id. § 2704(d)(4).
139 See Kristin Choo, The Price of Oil, ABA J. (Aug. 1, 2010),
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/the-price-of-oil/.
140 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1).
141 Id. § 2704(c)(2).
142 Id. § 2712(h)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV).
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presentation, the claimant may commence legal action. 143 The
OPA does not address whether partial payment that
unsatisfactorily settles a claim prevents subsequent OPA-based
litigation specific to that claim.
The OPA resolves many of the jurisdictional issues inherent
after an unlawful discharge of oil. Actions arising under the OPA
are to be heard in the U.S. district court for the district in which the
discharge or injury occurs, or the district in which the defendant
resides, is found, or has its primary place of business.144 State trial
courts may hear removal , and damage claims.145  These
jurisdictional rules are subject to a three year statute of limitations
on actions for damages and removal costs, a time period that
commences when "the loss and the connection of the loss with the
discharge in question are reasonably discoverable with the exercise
of due care."
B. Gulf Coast Claims Facility
After being designated a responsible party under the OPA, BP
established the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), administered
independently by Ken Feinberg, to provide an administrative
mechanism for quickly addressing claims arising from the spill,
and pledged to establish a $20 billion trust fund to satisfy claims
adjudicated by the GCCF. Because the GCCF is serving as a
primary mechanism of compensation, this Section focuses on
environmental justice concerns arising from it. The Section
examines issues regarding the claims allowed, the emergency
claims deadline, and the way in which BP provides funds for the
GCCF.
1. Allowed Claims
Although neither BP nor the federal government has indicated
with certainty that the GCCF was intended to satisfy BP's
compensation obligations under the OPA, the GCCF's descriptions
143 Id. § 2713(c).
144 Id. § 2717(b).
145 Id. § 2717.
146 Id.
147 See Jonathan Tilove, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Escrow Figure of $20
Billion Is Neither Floor Nor Ceiling for BP, Times-Picayune (June 16, 2010,
8:08 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/06/
gulf of mexico oil-spillescro.html.
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of itself suggest that the facility was established to address those
obligations, at least in part. For example, the GCCF's "Protocol for
Emergency Advance Payments" states that the U.S. Coast Guard
"directed BP to maintain a single claims facility for all
Responsible Parties to avoid confusion among potential
claimants." 148 Therefore, the "GCCF (and the protocols under
which it operates) are structured to be compliant with OPA."1 4 9
The GCCF also utilizes OPA provisions in order to regulate fund
policies, including whether or not a claim has been presented.' 5 0
While BP has also authorized the GCCF to process personal injury
claims outside the scope of the OPA, "submission of such claims
151[to the GCCF] shall be wholly voluntary."
Private individuals and businesses may file claims seeking
1152
compensation for "direct damages resulting from the Spill," and
for removal and cleanup costs "that result from actions [the
individual or business] took to prevent, mitigate or clean up
,,153damages or anticipated damages. Individuals and businesses
may also file claims for damage to real or personal property,
"measured by the cost of repair or replacement of the property
and/or the difference in the value of the property before and after
the damage.,,154 In the case of property that is leased or rented to a
third party, either the renter or the owner may file the claim, but
each must inform the other that the claim has been filed.15 5 There
148 Protocol for Emergency Advance Payments, GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY,
http://web.archive.org/web/20101123165056/http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/p
roto_1 (accessed by searching for http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/
proto_1 in the Internet Archive index).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Frequently Asked Questions, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY § 7,
http://web.archive.org/web/20101123161456/http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/f
aq (accessed by searching for www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq in the
Internet Archive index) (Compensation).
153 Id. § 8 (Removal and Clean Up Costs).
154 Id. § 9 (Damage to Real or Personal Property).
155 Id. ("Any Individual or Business that owns or rents Real or Personal
Property physically damaged or destroyed by the Spill may submit a claim to the
GCCF for damages to the affected Real or Personal Property, or for economic
losses resulting from the destruction of the affected property. If you are an owner
of a property that you lease to someone else, you must notify the lessee that you
are filing a claim. If you lease a property from someone else, you must notify the
owner that you are filing a claim.") The FAQ also specifies that "the GCCF will
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are two available claims for economic damages suffered from the156Oil Spill: "Lost Profits and Earning Capacity" claims and
"Loss of Subsistence Use of Natural Resources" claims. 1 Finally,
individuals may file a claim for physical injuries or deaths that
were "proximately caused by the Spill or the explosion and fire
associated with the Deepwater Horizon incident, or by the cleanup
of the Spill."1 58
In order to facilitate GCCF claims, BP established Claim
Centers and Community Outreach Centers throughout the
159
region. The federal government has established coordinating
One Stop Career Centers (Comprehensive and Affiliate), Small
Business Administration Offices, and Command Posts. While a
substantial number of the BP Claim Centers are in New Orleans
and the surrounding areas, Centers stretch as far as Naples and Key
West, Florida.161 These Claim Centers were largely designed to
help peo le process claims made on the $20 billion fund discussed
above.
The available claims may affect different communities in a
variety of ways. First, cleanup and oil removal costs must either be
"approved by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator" or be "otherwise
consistent with the National Contingency Plan."163 Differing
levels of access to the FOSC or lack of knowledge about the
National Contingency Plan may slow down individuals' ability to
access funds for cleanup and oil removal work already
accomplished, especially if some communities did not receive as
not pay the same claim for damages or losses to Real or Personal Property to
both an owner and a renter," and that it will "generally" defer to the owner if
both parties file. Id.
156 Id. § 10 (Lost Profits and Earning Capacity).
157 Id. § II (Loss of Subsistence Use of Natural Resources).
158 Id. § 12 (Physical Injury or Death).
159 A map of these centers is available at Gulf Response Mapping Site,
ENVTL. RESPONSE MGMT. APPLICATION, http://gomex.erma.noaa.gov/
erma.html#x=-88.3638 1 &y=28.73568&z=6&layers= 11144+5723+2948 (last
updated July 17, 2012),
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Claims Site Offices, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY,
http://web.archive.org/web/20101123161519/http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/f
acility (accessed by searching for http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/facility
in the Internet Archive index).
163 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 152, § 8 (Removal and Clean Up
Costs).
132 [Volume 20
BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
much information about the need for pre-approval. Second,
although either the owner or the renter may file a claim for damage
to real or personal property, the Frequently Asked Questions
section notes that the owner will ordinarily receive the
compensation unless the renter has a demonstrated contractual
right to the damages.' 6 4
In addition, claims based on "Loss of Subsistence Use of
Natural Resources" may be harder to obtain. The GCCF website
notes that "[t]housands of identical claims for Loss of Subsistence
Use of Natural Resources have been submitted to the GCCF with
no documentation other than standard form letters signed by local
officials stating that the claimant has experienced hardship in a 'fill
in the blank' specified monthly amount as a result of the increase
in seafood production costs after the Spill."l65 According to the
GCCF, "[t]hese claims are not sufficient for payment." 66
Subsistence Use of Natural Resources claims are supposed to be
for "damages to a claimant's ability to rely, without purchase, on
natural resources for food, shelter, or other minimum necessities of
life,"1 6 7 such as "a claimant who depends upon his or her ability to
harvest fish that he or she depends upon for food may have a claim
for the cost of replacing fish the claimant was unable to harvest
168because of the closure of fishing waters." Since the
communities likely to need these types of subsistence claims may
be primarily comprised of people of color, low-income people, and
Indian Tribes, increased scrutiny related to these claims may make
it harder for these groups to access much-needed subsistence
income.
Finally, GCCF claims for personal injury or death are
explicitly prohibited from including compensation for emotional or
169
mental health injuries. This prohibition may disproportionately
164 See supra note 157.
165 Claims for Loss of Subsistence Use of Natural Resources, GULF COAST
CLAIMS FACILITY,
http://web.archive.org/web/20101 018000528/http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.
com/ (accessed by searching for www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com in the Internet
Archive index).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 152, § 12 ("An injury that relates
to emotional or mental health is not a physical injury and is not an eligible
claim.").
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affect communities of color and low-income people given the
often greater barriers to their accessing emotional or mental health
assistance outside of compensation by the GCCF.
2. Emergency Advance Payments Deadline
The OPA attempts to ensure implementation of procedures
that make claimants whole as quickly as possible, and at no point
in the Act are responsible parties given the right to preclude future
litigation. Instead, the OPA takes affirmative steps to restrict
transfer of liability.170 The statute makes clear that liability is
intended to remain with the responsible party in all but the most
complete of claim settlements. However, the GCCF initially set a
deadline for Emergency Advance Payments, designating that after
the deadline, the only payments available will be accompanied by
a waiver of liability. The GCCF has since addressed these
concerns to some extent by allowing those who submit final
payment forms to receive partial payments without a liability
waiver and added quick payment and interim payment processes.
However, the major difference early on between the options of
those who submitted before and after the Emergency Advance171Payment deadline raised environmental justice concerns. In
addition, at the time, discerning the overarching GCCF policy
required synthesizing two separate answers on the GCCF's
"Frequently Asked Questions" page. Adding to the confusion,
the Emergency Advance Payment and the Final Payment claims
used the same form. 173 This Section explores these issues and the
ways in which the initial GCCF procedures around emergency
procedures violated the OPA.
The OPA requires that responsible parties establish a method
of making interim short-term payments to individuals and
170 33 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (stating that, while indemnification agreements
are allowed, transfers of liability are not).
171 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 152.
172 Compare id. § 5.1 (Claims for Emergency Payment) (describing condition
that Emergency Advance Payments must be submitted by November 23, 2010),
with id. § 5.11 (describing condition that in order to obtain a Final Payment,
claimant must sign a "Release and Waiver").
173 See Instructions-Gulf Coast Claims Facility Claim Form, GULF COAST
CLAIMS FACILITY 1-2, http://web.archive.org/web/20101216021548/
http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/Instructions-GCCFClaimForm.pdf (accessed
by searching for http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/Instructions-GCCF-
ClaimForm.pdf in the Internet Archive index).
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businesses affected by the unlawful discharge of oil. 1 74 Under
OPA § 2705, "[p]ayment or settlement of a claim for interim,
short-term damages representing less than the full amount of
damages to which the claimant ultimately may be entitled shall not
preclude recovery by the claimant for damages not reflected in the
paid or settled partial claim.",175 Despite the language of OPA §
2705, the GCCF imposed a November 23, 2010 deadline for
claimants to submit claims for Emergency Advance Payments.' 7 6
After this deadline, these payments were no lon e7r available, and
the GCCF shifted to issuing Final Payments. In the period
preceding November 23, this deadline was alluded to on the
GCCF's "Frequently Asked Questions" website. In response to the
question "Do I waive my legal rights by filing a claim?" the GCCF
responds "no."178 "You do not waive or release any legal rights by
filing a claim for Emergency Advance Payments with the GCCF.
If you apply for Final Payment and the GCCF finds that you are
eligible for Final Payment then you will be required to sign a
Release to receive a Final Payment."1
79
The GCCF went into a bit more detail in the eight pages of
instructions provided for filing a claim form. "If you accept that
determination, to receive a Final Payment you will have to sign a
release waiving any rights you may have against BP to assert
additional claims, to file an individual legal action or to participate
in other legal actions associated with the Spill." While this does
further describe the repercussions of accepting a Final Payment,
precise distinctions between the two forms of GCCF relief are
susceptible to misunderstanding, as the deadline is not mentioned
in conjunction with this information. Also, that Emergency
Advance Payments and Final Payments used exactly the same
form might contribute to claimant confusion.1 8 1
As a result, some individual claimants without the benefit of
174 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2006).
175 Id.
176 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 152, § 4 (How to File a
Claim).
177 See id.
178 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 152, § 3 (Who May File a
Claim).
179 Id.
180 See Instructions-Gulf Coast Claims Facility Claim Form, supra note
173, at 2.
181 Id. at 1-2.
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legal counsel might unknowingly have foregone their rights to
future litigation in exchange for a payment received before the full
scope of damages proximately caused by the oil spill is known.
Such a payment would be necessarily incomplete, and the OPA
restricts use of such payments as tools of liability limitation.182
The GCCF has taken some steps that address this problem. By
processing just a small fraction of the Final Payment claimants
registered by October 2010, the GCCF prevented unintentional
releases of liability.183 Because of the important legal restrictions
that accompany Final Payments, a delay in this aspect of the
claims process was in keeping with the OPA.
The GCCF issued partial payments as Emergency Advance
Payments to "Individuals and Businesses that are experiencing
financial hardship resulting from damages incurred by the
Spill."' 84 They appear to be the GCCF's version of the "interim,
short-term damages" required by OPA § 2705.195 However, there
are important distinctions between federal regulation and GCCF
policy. According to the OPA, "[p]ayment or settlement of a claim
for interim, short-term damages representing less than the full
amount of damages to which the claimant ultimately may be
entitled shall not preclude recovery by the claimant for damages
not reflected in the paid or settled partial claim." Importantly,
no deadline is mentioned in OPA § 2705, and the section instead
precludes issuance of waivers of liability "for damages not
reflected in the paid or settled partial claim."l 87 This language is
indicative of the importance the OPA places on making claimants
whole. While timetables are mentioned in the OPA, they almost
exclusively restrict the actions of the responsible party, not the
182 33 U.S.C. § 2715 (2006) (stipulating that payment of final damages "shall
not foreclose a claimant's right to recover all damages to which the claimant
otherwise is entitled under this Act or under any other law").
183 See GCCF Program Statistics-Overall Summary (as of October 27,
2010), GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, http://web.archive.org/web/
20101028142924/http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/GCCF_.Overall StatusRep
ort.pdf (accessed by searching for www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/
GCCFOverallStatusReport.pdf in the Internet Archive index).
184 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 152, § 5 (Claims for
Emergency Advance Payment).
185 33 U.S.C. § 2705.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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claimant.188 The only restrictions on claimants provide for ample
time to file claims of any kind against the responsible party. For
example, regarding removal costs, "[n]o claim may be presented
under this subchapter for recovery of removal costs for an incident
unless the claim is presented within 6 years after the date of
completion of all removal actions for that incident."18 9 Nowhere in
the statute is it suggested that a deadline of mere months is
appropriate.
The deadline for Emergency Advance Payment claim
submissions was not widely reported in the national press. Unless
the GCCF engaged in extensive local advertising, the deadline may
have gone largely unnoticed among many residents of the Gulf
Coast, which contains numerous communities of color where
190
environmental justice concerns are of acute importance. Some
of these residents may have become aware of the deadline and its
significance only after November 23, 2010. At that point, they
would no longer be able to submit an Emergency Advance
Payment Claim; instead, they would have faced the choice of
either accepting a Final Payment and releasing BP of future
liability or forgoing non-litigious reimbursement altogether. While
the changes to allow more flexibility in Final Payment claims and
add an Interim Payment option ameliorate these concerns
significantly, the initial approach of the GCCF to Emergency
Payments does not appear to have comported with the OPA or to
have adequately protected the claims options for vulnerable
populations.
3. Sources of GCCF Funds
Since the GCCF's inception, the trust has been funded largely
188 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2714 (2006) (requiring that the responsible party
begin advertising information about the unlawful discharge and the
compensation fund no later than fifteen days after the designation is made, and
continue advertising for at least thirty days).
189 33 U.S.C. §2712(h)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
190 Residents of towns like Mossville, Louisiana, a predominately African-
American community nestled in between the Gulf of Mexico and "Cancer
Alley," have filed human rights complaints with the Organization of American
States as a result of widespread industrial pollution in the area. See Ike
Sriskandarajah, Human Rights in 'Cancer Alley', PUB. RADIO INT'L (Apr. 26,
2010), http://www.pri.org/science/environment/ human-rights-in-cancer-
alleyl965.html.
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by BP's future earnings.191 The popular and financial press has
reported that GCCF funding hin es upon BP's Gulf of Mexico
subsidiary remaining profitable. BP did not sell assets to amass
the $20 billion pledged to the GCCF, but instead securitized future
193
earnings. The trust agreement provides that "the Grantor hereby
agrees to grant, convey, and/or assign to the Trust first priority
perfected security interests in production paymentispertaining to
the Grantor's U.S. oil and natural gas production." As a result,
BP holds a significant advantage in negotiating the terms of
continued drilling in the Gulf.
As a sizeable corporation, BP could have funded even the
multi-billion dollar GCCF trust in a number of ways. However, the
company chose to offer royalties from production on its Thunder
Horse, Atlantis, Mad Dog, Great White, Mars, Ursa, and Na Kika
oil and gas assets, all located in the Gulf of Mexico, as collateral to
the GCCF. 195 These fields, with the exception of Mars, are in 4000
19619feet of water or more. Mars lies in almost 3000 feet of water.197
In effect, before October 12, 2010, when the Obama
Administration announced the lifting of the moratorium on
deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico,198 BP tied the success of
the deepwater drilling moratorium to the reduction or failure of
GCCF funding. As of late October 2010, the GCCF had handled
claims from 87,080 claimants, and paid out a total of over $1.5
191 See Trust Agreement between BP Exploration & Production, Inc., John S.
Martin, Jr., Kent D. Syverud, & Citigroup Trust-Delaware (Aug. 9, 2010),
available at http://motherjones.com/files/2010-8-9TrustAgreement.pdf
[hereinafter Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement].
192 See Clifford Krauss and John M. Broder, BP Says Limits on Drilling
Imperil Spill Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/business/03bp.html (referring to the Gulf
Coast Claims Facility).
193 See Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement, supra note 191.
194 Id. at 4.
195 See Ian Walker, BP Pledges Assets as Gulf Spill Collateral, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000142405274870385920
4575525482920628758.html.
196 See Industry Projects, NET RES. INT'L, http://www.offshore-
technology.com/projects/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2012) (separate link for each
asset; Great White is discussed under the name "Perdido Regional Host
Development").
197 Id.
198 See Obama Administration Lifts Deepwater Drilling Moratorium, Fox
NEWS, Oct. 12, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/10/12/white-house-
drilling-moratorium-lifted-soon.
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billion.199 A sustained moratorium on deepwater oil and gas
production in the Gulf of Mexico would have meant a substantial
delay in issuance of GCCF payments, if not a complete
undermining of the trust. BP, in effect, linked the legal rights of
OPA claimants with the company's continued prosperity as a
result of the very drilling that caused the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill.
C. Governmental Distribution of Funds
Federal, state, and local government also have been playing a
significant role in compensating victims. The following Sections
detail the federal and the state and local funding mechanisms and
their environmental justice implications.
1. Federal
Federal agencies incur oil spill-related costs in a variety of
ways. They incur personnel costs when hiring temporary workers
who engage in public health monitoring, monitoring the spread of
oil, resource distribution, compensation administration, field
200programming, and other tasks. Federal agencies also engage in
direct and indirect compensatory activities, including "work,
services, and materials procured under contract for purposes
related to the Oil Spill," and "agency activities to mitigate the
impacts of the Oil Spill, [including] mobilization of resources to
coordinate benefit issuance and the dissemination of public
,201information." Finally, the large federal bureaucracy has
attendant costs: "[t]ransportation costs," "[t]ravel expenses and per
diem, including a wide range of costs incurred while on travel" for
federal employees, "Loiffice supplies, equipment, and capital
and/or maintenance costs for new or expanded field sites,"
"materials, equipment, and supplies related to clean-up," and
"shipping costs and materials."
All of the money for these federal expenditures is provided
for by the responsible party, and the Obama Administration has
199 See GCCF Program Statistics-Overall Summary, supra note 183.
200 Oil Spill Cost and Reimbursement Fact Sheet, RESTORETHEGULF.GOV
(July 12, 2011, 9:15 AM), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2011/07/12/oil-
spill-cost-and-reimbursement-fact-sheet (detailing various costs incurred by the
Federal government).
201 Id.
202 Id.
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kept detailed records for agency appropriations, bills sent, and
money received as part of BP's OPA obligations. The Federal
On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) is responsible for assessing and
identifying costs assumed by federal agencies attributable to the
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, and operates under the auspices
of the Coast Guard.204 As of July 2011, the Obama Administration
estimated that it had spent $716.6 million in oil cleanup costs
related to the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, for which it had
sent twelve invoices to BP for reimbursement. Since
"[r]esponsible parties are financially liable for all costs associated
with oil removal, including efforts to stop the leak at its source,
reduce the spread of oil, protect the shoreline and mitigate damage
to the public health or welfare,"206 the federal government's
current approach is to spend money and then "bill responsible
parties regularly for costs."207
In addition to overseeing the oil spill response as detailed
above, the Coast Guard is also responsible for administration of
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF).208 Created in 1986
and funded in conjunction with passage of the OPA, the OSLTF
"is a billion-dollar fund established as a funding source to pay
removal costs and damages resulting from oil spills . . . [and] is
used for costs not directly paid by the polluter .. ." 209 Of the two
major OSLTF components, one is particularly relevant to the
federal government's BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill cleanup and
compensation regime: the Emergency Fund. The Emergency Fund
"is available to pay for pollution removal activities, as well as the
initiation of natural resource damage assessments. These
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. The $716.6 million number was obtained by adding the amounts
shown for each of the twelve bills. The Administration has not released a
thirteenth bill as of January 2012.
206 Administration Sends Eighth Bill to BP, RESTORETHEGULF.GOV (Nov. 19,
2010), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/11/19/administration-sends-
eighth-bill-bp.
207 Id.
208 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, NAT'L POLLUTION FUNDS CTR., U.S. COAST
GUARD, www.uscg.mil/npfc/AboutNPFC/opa.asp (last updated July 11, 2012).
209 U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NPFCPUB 16465.2,
OIL SPILL LIABILITY TRUST FUND (OSLTF) FUNDING FOR OIL SPILLS 1 (2006),
available at
http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/docs/PDFs/OSLTFFunding-forOilSpills.pdf.
210 Oil Spill Cost and Reimbursement Fact Sheet, supra note 200.
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expenditures are authorized by the FOSC.211 The Emergency Fund
"is capitalized by an annual $50 million apportionment from the
OSLTF," and provides a backup funding source for cleanup and
compensation costs that may not be reimbursed by BP.2 1 2
There is some degree of overlap between federal responses
and the state and private responses detailed below, especially in
efforts to coordinate resources, compensation, and cleanup by the
Obama Administration and by BP. Some of these overlaps are
explicitly provided for, and the federal government assumes
coordination responsibility. For example,
[i]f other Federal, state, local, or tribal agencies assist the FOSC
with removal activities, they can sign an agreement ... which
provides funding of those removal activities out of the OSLTF.
The [agreement] specifies which removal activities will be
reimbursed, and establishes a dollar limit-or "ceiling." The
agencies subsequently obligate funds against that ceiling, and
are reimbursed from the OSLTF Emergency Fund.213
The Emergency Fund also provides a backup reimbursement
mechanism for claimants, because "[c]laimants (individuals,
corporations, and government entities) can submit claims for
uncompensated removal costs and OPA damages (listed above)
caused by the oil spill to the [U.S. Coast Guard National Pollution
Funds Center ("NPFC")] if the [responsible party] does not satisfy
their claims. NPFC adjudicates the claims and pays those with
,214
merit." While the chain of command appears clear from
government information, news outlets and on-the-ground
spectators have criticized the confusion surrounding who is in
charge. Some of the confusion stems from attempts to have
those parties best suited to certain areas respond based on
preexisting expertise in particular areas of oil spill management
211 Id.
212 U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 209, at 1-2 (discussing various parties
and their ability to access the Emergency Fund).
213 Oil Spill Cost and Reimbursement Fact Sheet, supra note 200. The
agreement signed is called a "Pollution Removal Funding Authorization." Id.
214 U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 209, at 2.
215 See, e.g., Mark Sappenfeld, The Gulf Spill Oil Muddle: When Oil Nears
Shore, Confision Begins, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, June 6, 2010,
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0606/The-Gulf-oil-spill-muddle-when-oil-
nears-shore-confusion-begins (noting that the "gap-the space between the
logistical capabilities that BP brings to bear and the Coast Guard's ability to
oversee their deployment effectively-has been the single murkiest area of
command and control during the cleanup.").
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and cleanup.2 16
Little information on the Obama Administration's Gulf Coast
Response website details specific responses tailored to meet
environmental justice concerns of compensation distribution, at
least on the front page. 2 17 However, some federal response actions
will have effects on environmental justice concerns beyond the
issues described in the previous Sections. OSLTF funds represent
an additional source of compensation for private organizations and
individuals. Such organizations and individuals may be able to
access the OSLTF Emergency Fund for claims not reimbursed by
BP, subject to the limitations already noted. In the aftermath of the
spill, though, the limited funding for the OSLTF Emergency Fund
created concerns about whether there would be adequate funds for
claims by communities made up of people of color and low-
income people. The OPA provides funding for the OSLTF218Emergency Fund at $50 million dollars per year, and has long
been criticized as lacking enough funds to fulfill its mandate in the
wake of a disaster the scale of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill.2 19
216 Id. ("The federal government has never contested BP's management of
the effort to kill or contain the well-BP alone has the tools and technical know-
how. But the shoreline has been a gray area.").
217 For example, there is no section at the bottom of the government response
website titled "environmental justice" or "communities of color" or any other
moniker traditionally associated with environmental justice concerns. See
RESTORETHEGULF.GOV, http://www.restorethegulf.gov/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2012) (listing "Task Force," "Assistance," "Health & Safety," "Fish & Wildlife,"
"Environment" and "News" navigational categories at the bottom of every page;
none of these categories have sub-categories that make explicit reference to
traditional environmental justice communities, though some of the categories
clearly reference relevant communities).
218 U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 209, at 1.
219 For a selection of these criticisms, see Alfred Saunders, The Real Oil
Fund, AM. CONSERVATIVE PARTY (June 23, 2010, 2:45 AM),
http://www.theamericanconservatives.org/cms/index.php?option=com content&
view=article&id=27 I:the-real-oil-fund&catid=977:blog&itemid=175:
"The purpose of the OSLTF is to help with oil spills.... The oil
companies have been paying this tax for years in order to help with this
kind of scenario. Presumably, the oil companies pass on the cost of the
tax to the consumers[,] which means we have already paid for part of
this cleanup. So where's the money? In short, the federal government
borrowed it from the OSLTF for other uses."
See also Brian P. O'Neill, An Oil Liability Primer, NAT'L L.J. (June 14, 2010),
LEXIS 1202462432272 ("The maximum payout from the OSLTF for the BP
Gulf oil spill is $1 billion. Claims are processed in the order received, and claims
are paid out in the order approved. In other words, the OSLTF operates on a first-
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2. State and Local Government
The federal government is not the only distributor of aid to
victims of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. In addition to the
$20 billion fund established for the GCCF and federal government
resources detailed above, the OPA requires that BP reimburse state
and local governments for their efforts to clean up spill harms.2 2 0
BP has chosen to implement this payment system separately from
the GCCF; while private parties apply to the GCCF, administered
as above, state and local governments apply directly to BP.
According to BP, "Government claims" serviced by BP directly
include "claims and funding requests for losses and/or expenses
incurred by states, parishes, counties, Indian Tribes and other
government entities and political subdivisions."2 2 2 There are
certain types of OPA claims that are mainly or only available to
these types of government entities: Natural Resources DamaAes,
Loss of Government Revenue, and Increased Public Services.
Under the rubric of "Natural Resource Damages," designated
federal, state, and local government entities may be reimbursed for
costs for "[a]ssessing an area's natural resource damages,
[r]estoring the natural resources, and [c]ompensating the public for
come, first-served basis."); Sima J. Gandhi, The Big Oil Discount, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (May 13, 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/05/
big-oil-discount.html:
"Even with [a proposed] higher cap [on per-incident liability], however,
the OSLTF will likely run out of money. It earned about $250 million
from the 8-cent per barrel tax between October of last year and the end
of April, but this tax expires in 2017 or when the OSLTF hits $2.7
billion dollars (whichever comes first)."
220 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006).
221 Compensation, BP,
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle800.docategoryld=9036584&contentld
=7067605 (last visited Nov. 15, 2012) (providing separate links for
"Compensating individuals and local businesses," and "Compensating
governmental and other agencies"); compare Government Claims, BP,
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryld=9036595&contentd=70
67576 (last visited Nov. 15, 2012) ("All government claims and funding requests
will be handled by a specialized team and given high priority. BP has made
advanced funds available to the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and
Mississippi, as well as several local parishes in Louisiana."), with Compensation,
supra, (redirecting "Compensating individuals and local businesses" to the main
GCCF website instead of an internal BP webpage).
222 Government Claims, supra note 221.
223 U.S. Coast Guard, Oil Spill Claims, NAT'L POLLUTION FUNDS CTR.,
http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/claims/ (last updated Aug. 7, 2012).
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the lost use of the affected resources.',224 Federal, state, and local
governments may also file claims for loss of government revenues
from the spill, and from increased public services they have had to
pay out as a result of the spill.225 Finally, governmental entities are
eligible to file claims in a similar manner to those claims filed by
private parties: they (along with "Clean-up contractors," and any
private party who helps to clean up) may file claims to recover
removal costs for any costs incurred to "prevent, minimize,
mitigate, or clean up an oil spill," for compensation for property or
boat damage, or for lost profits and earning c'apacity.226
In addition to receiving aid from BP, state and local
governments, along with Indian Tribes and regional operations, are
also engaged in the distribution of aid. These governments may be
designated natural resource trustees tasked with compensating the
public for loss of natural resources. They may also be distributing
the funds obtained from GCCF funds to compensate or otherwise
ameliorate harms felt by the spill. Finally, some states and
localities have set up their own command centers to deal with
regional or local issues specific to their areas.227 These efforts may
use state or local funds, or funds obtained from other sources (such
as charities) to compensate victims for harms sustained as a result
of the oil spill.228
States, tribes, -and localities distributing compensation and
cleanup funding in the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill continue to face obstacles in meeting the needs of
communities largely comprised of low-income people and people
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 See, e.g., LA. OIL SPILL COORDINATOR'S OFFICE, http://www.losco
.state.1a.us/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2012); LA. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
NATURAL RES. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, http://losco-dwh.com/ (last visited Nov.
15, 2012).
228 BP has established a specific site for each state that lists available
resources and charitable organizations aiding with recovery efforts for particular
localities. See, e.g., Florida Gulf Response, BP, http://web.archive.org/web/
20110711011955/http://www.floridagulfresponse.com/go/site/30591 (accessed
by searching for http://www.floridagulfresponse.com/go/site/3059/ in the
Internet Archive index); Alabama Gulf Response, - BP,
http://web.archive.org/web/20110707102435/
http://www.alabamagulfresponse.com/go/site/3051/ (accessed by searching for
http://www.alabamagulfresponse.com/go/site/3051/ in the Internet Archive
index).
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of color. Some of these issues will be similar to those faced by the
federal government, but not all will apply in exactly the same
fashion. First, it is less clear that states, localities, and tribes are
subject to Executive Order 12,898, as the text of the order only
specifies federal agencies. However, to the extent that state and
local governments participate in reimbursement through the
OSLTF, there may be oversight by federal agencies subject to the
Order. Each state has set up an official BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill response web though none mentions environmental
justice explicitly. Mississippi, however, has a "Community
Engagement" section of its Department of Environmental Quality
website that held an "Environmental Justice Summit" in February
2011, suggesting that more state-specific responses may be
230forthcoming. The actual cleanup efforts, including efforts at
monitoring and compensation, may also disproportionately help
low-income people and people of color insofar as their
communities are likely to be more affected by public health
problems. Local governments may also be able to better assess the
needs of vulnerable populations.
State and local government distribution of compensation to
victims of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill will also depend on
the money received from BP. For example, if a state or locality is a
designated natural resource trustee, and is compensated for natural
resources damage in order to compensate "the public for the. lost
,231
use of the affected resources, private parties most affected by
the loss of those resources may be able to petition the natural
229 See Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Information, ALA. DEP'T OF ENvTL. MGMT.,
http://adem.alabama.gov/morelnfo/oilspill.cnt (last visited Nov. 15, 2012);
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response & Restoration, FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL.
PROT., http://www.dep.state.fl.us/deepwaterhorizon/default.htm (last visited Nov.
15, 2012); LA. OIL SPILL COORDINATOR'S OFFICE, supra note 227; 2010 Oil Spill
Incident Response and Information, Miss. DEP'T OF MARINE RES.,
http://www.dmr.ms.gov/2010-oil-spill-response-and-information (last visited
Nov 15, 2012); Oil Spills, TEX. GEN. LAND OFFICE,
http://www.glo.texas.gov/what-we-do/caring-for-the-coast/oil-spills/index.html
(last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
230 See Office of Community Engagement, Miss. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY,
http://www.deq.state.ms.us/mdeq.nsflpage/CEHomeopendocument (last
visited Nov. 15, 2012); see also Upcoming Community Engagement and
Environmental Justice Summit 2011, MDEQ ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS (Miss.
Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Jackson, Miss.), September 2010, at 12, available at
http://www.deq.state.ms.us/mdeq.nsf/pdf/MainVol7lssue7MDEQNewsletter/$F
ile/Vol.%207%20Issue%207.pdf?OpenElement.
231 NAT'L POLLUTION FUNDS CTR., supra note 223.
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resource trustee for access to some of the money received.
However, the OPA does not make clear whether natural resource
trustees are required to make private payouts, or whether public
works activity (such as building a park to replace a lost or
damaged river in an affected community) would fulfill statutory
obligations.
Third, state and locality payments and expenditures will have
similar, but slightly different concerns with regard to OSLTF
Emergency Fund crowd out. If the Emergency Fund limits are met
only through federal and state expenditures, low-income people
and people of color are dependent on decisions by those entities
that take disproportionate harm and need into account in order to
be funded. In addition, states with more advanced rubrics and
responses for accessing and mobilizing to file for federal money
may also be better able to reach communities of color and low-
232income populations. This means that States and localities that
fail to mobilize may not be able to aid these populations as
effectively.
D. Litigation
When the GCCF, federal, state, and local resources described
in previous Sections have been exhausted, or perhaps in lieu of
seeking them, litigation provides a final compensation mechanism
for victims of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. This Section
details both litigation by victims under tort and admiralty law and
litigation by government and nongovernmental organizations
under the OPA and environmental law.
1. Private Litigation
Victims filed hundreds of actions in the aftermath of the spill:
"[ais of June 24, 2010, a total of 218 claims arising from the oil
spill had already been filed in federal district courts in 10 different
states: Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas."
232 For example, BP's local site for Alabama lists no local organizations it is
working with; its Louisiana local site lists over forty. Compare BP, Alabama
Gulf Response, supra note 228, with BP, Louisiana Gulf Response, supra note
228.
233 Scott Summy, Managing Claims Arising from the Gulf Coast Oil Spill:
Multidistrict Litigation v. the $20 Billion Fund, BNA'S Toxics L. REP., July 8,
2010, available at 2010 WL 2695523.
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Most of these are tort cases filed individually or as class actions,234
though some are shareholder class actions or derivative suits.
Seventy-seven of these cases were transferred by the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") on
August 10, 2010, to the Eastern District of Louisiana to be
adjudicated together by Judge Carl J. Barbier as MDL No.
2179.235 These seventy-seven cases are comprised mostly of the
tort suits, but also include at least one Clean Water Act
enforcement action, two wrongful death actions, and one personal
injury action.236 MDL No. 2179 is likely to be the default for
transfer of new claims filed,237 and at least some currently filed
environmental suits were stayed in anticipation of being
transferred to the MDL.238 The Panel has indicated that it believes
that more than 200 "tag-along" actions may eventually be part of
MDL No. 2179. 23 It has also set deadlines for filing claims
against Transocean, held monthly status conferences, dismissed
RICO claims, and issued forty-eight Pretrial Orders governing
pleadin s, deposition protocol, and notification, among other
things. While the OPA limits BP's liability for suits, it does not
limit liability in the case of negligence claims under state law.
Thus, almost all tort suits have alleged negli ence by BP or one of
the other companies involved in the spill. On March 2, 2012,
the parties announced a tentative settlement for MDL No. 2179,
and Judge Barbier issued a series of orders adjourning a trial that
234 Melinda Arbuckle, Case Chart, BP LITIGATION, http://sites.google.com/
site/bplitigation/home/case-chart (last visited July 22, 2012) (organizing
litigation filed at that point for law students in Complex Litigation and noting the
claims cited in each case).
235 See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," in the Gulf of
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 731 F.Supp.2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010).
236 Id. at 1353-54 (discussing the actions included in the MDL).
237 See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Three Environmental Groups Sue BP over Gulf
Oil Spill, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/oct/21/nation/la-na-bp-lawsuit-20101021 (quoting environmental lawyers
as assuming that their newly filed claims will be rolled into the "massive" MDL).
238 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., No. 10-0254-
WS-C, 2010 WL 3522399 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2010).
239 In re Oil Spill, 731 F.Supp.2d at 1353.
240 See MDL-2719 Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon", E. DIsT.
LA., http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/OilSpill.htm (last updated Nov. 16,
2012) (providing updates on the progress of the MDL cases).
241 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c) (2006); Arbuckle, supra note 234 (noting the claims
filed in each BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill case, almost all of which include a
negligence claim).
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had been scheduled to commence March 5, 2012, creating
transition processes, and appointing interim class counsel.242
In addition to MDL No. 2179, two other sets of claims have
been consolidated into MDL No. 2185. These claims involve, first,
"securities plaintiffs [who] assert that they purchased BP securities
at inflated prices based on defendants' repeated assurances of BP's
safe operations, but then suffered losses following the Deepwater
Horizon explosion/fire and subsequent oil spill."243 They also
involve
ERISA plaintiffs [who] allege that defendants breached their
fiduciary duties to participants and/or beneficiaries of one or more
BP employee retirement plans with respect to those plans'
investments in those same securities, when defendants knew or
should have known of serious and ongoing safety and maintenance
problems at the company -roblems that culminated in the
Deepwater Horizon incident.
MDL No. 2185 was transferred to Judge Keith P. Ellison in
the Southern District of Texas for pretrial proceedings. On
February 13, 2012, Judge Ellison granted in part and denied in part
defendants' motion to dismiss on the securities fraud claims. Judge
Ellison also granted the defendants' motion to dismiss as to one
particular subclass of securities fraud plaintiffs who based their
claims on BP statements about oil well safety. Judge Ellison
previously dismissed the shareholder derivative lawsuit as more
appropriately brought in England on September 15, 2011. 245
It is difficult to predict how many lawsuits will end up being
filed, and the total may be somewhat dependent on perceptions of
the efficacy of the GCCF. The environmental justice implications
of any particular lawsuit are also difficult to gauge. However,
some potential implications are discernible. First, there are effects
242 MDL-2179, supra note 240; John Schwartz, Accord Reached Settling
Lawsuit over BP Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/03/03/us/accord-reached-settling-lawsuit-over-bp-oil-spill.html? r=2.
243 In re BP Sec., Derivative & Employment Ret. Income Sec. Act Litig., 734
F.Supp.2d 1380, 1382 (J.P.M.L. 2010).
244 Id.
245 Id. at 1383; In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-2185, 2012 WL
432611 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2012); In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-
2185, 2012 WL 468519 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2012); see id. at *1 n.3 (explaining
the different legal theories advanced by different plaintiff subclasses); In re BP
S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 4:10-cv-3447, 2011 WL 4345209 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 15, 2011).
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predicated on success or failure of the litigation at issue. To the
extent that plaintiffs who are low-income or persons of color win
monetary settlements or at trial, this compensation may alleviate
some harms incurred by the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. On
the other hand, long delays and eventual losses may strain an
already-burdened population.
Second, favorable lawsuits have the potential to change
safety-or at least liability-standards for future BP operations in
246deepwater drilling. For some types of lawsuits, this may be the
main outcome with the potential to help low-income people or
people of color. In the BP Securities Litigation, for example,
plaintiffs argue that "BP and its, executives misled the investing
public concerning the company's safety measures and commitment
to conducting safe operations." 247 These claims do not rely on
harms felt by people necessarily residing in the Gulf Coast region,
and shareholder litigation is predicated on owning stock in BP,
which is not typically common in predominantly low-income
communities or communities of color. Nevertheless, the securities
action alleges "that BP and its executives misled the investing
public concerning the company's safety measures and failed to
disclose that its safety procedures were inadequate and that it cut
costs at the expense of safety."24 8 In order to prove its claims,
discovery in the case will focus on BP's "safety record over at
least the past five years, and, in particular, the alleged duty of BP
officials to recognize and disclose the likelihood that a calamity
,249
such as this might occur." These types of lawsuits, even if they
do not provide direct compensation to communities comprised
largely of low-income people and people of color, may
nevertheless provide powerful information and incentive for BP to
engage in safer future practices.
However, the immediate history suggests that protracted
litigation has the potential to have emotional consequences for
victims. While all environmental situations are different, one
commentator on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill has investigated the
246 Defenders of Wildlife v. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., No. 10-0254-WS-C, 2010
WL 3522399, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2010) (describing the ways in which
Plaintiffs believe the safety process before the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
failed).
247 In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2010).
248 Id.
249 Id.
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effects of protracted litigation on participants.250 Noting that
adversarial litigation tactics taken to extend the litigation and avoid
huge payouts may have psychosocial implications for victims and
may end up being a "secondary disaster" that harms victims even
after the spill is over, J. Steven Picou cautions against viewing
litigation itself as a solution without attendant costs.25 1 Other
academics have long questioned the ability of adversarial litigation
to bring about either social change or closure for plaintiffs.252
Concerns about these effects may have changed the litigation
strategies of attorneys filing suit after the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill; for example, a far larger number of the suits filed are
individual rather than class actions. However, these concerns about
the long-term repercussions of litigation caution against relying
solely on litigation as a stopgap for problems with accessing
compensation highlighted above.
2. The Oil Pollution Act and Environmental Law
The Obama Administration has brought suits against BP and
some of the other responsible companies under the OPA and other
253
environmental laws in the Eastern District of Louisiana. In
addition, at least three environmental groups have filed suit
charging that 13P "violat[ed] the act because it has discharged oil
into the gulf, and failed to measure the oil's plume and flow and to
remove the oil."254 At least one group also sent EPA a notice of
intent to pursue a claim against Lisa Jackson, Administrator of the
EPA, for failure to perform nondiscretionary duties under the
250 J. Steven Picou, When the Solution Becomes the Problem: The Impacts of
Adversarial Litigation on Survivors of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 68 (2009) (showing negative impact).
251 Id. at 86-88.
252 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (arguing against the ability of
litigation to effect social change).
253 Complaint, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod. Inc., No. 2:10-cv-
04536 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2010), available at
http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/Environmental Law/USDOJ
BP Complaint.pdf; Department of Justice Intends to Sue Oil Companies in Gulf
Spill, JOPLIN GLOBE, Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.joplinglobe.com/nationall
x422129506/Department-of-Justice-intends-to-sue-oil-companies-in-gulf-spill.
254 Steve Kellman, Environmental Groups Sue BP Under Clean Water Act,
CIRCLE OF BLUE (June 7, 2010, 10:27 AM), http://www.circleofblue.org/
waternews/20 I 0/world/north-americalenvironmental-groups-sue-bp-under-clean-
water-act/.
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Clean Water Act (CWA). 255
The CWA imposes civil penalties for illegal discharges of
256pollutants and criminalizes certain conduct as well. Section 311
of the CWA explicitly provides that environmental officials may
prohibit any discharge of oil that "may be harmful to the public
health or welfare or environment of the United States. . . The
EPA has promulgated what is known as the "sheen test," which
provides that any oil spill that causes "a film or sheen upon or
discoloration of the surface of the water or adjoining shorelines"
constitutes a harmful quantity of oil that is prohibited by the
258CWA. The CWA criminally punishes negligent violations, and
is subject to a punishment "by a fine of not less thanl $2500 nor
more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for
not more than 1 year, or by both."2 5 9 Higher penalties are available
for knowing violations of the act, and of knowing endangerment
260
under the CWA. Enforcement actions under the CWA may be
261
prosecuted by either the federal government or by private
parties through the CWA citizen suit provision.
In addition to the CWA, the federal government uses three
other major statutes to protect Sp ecies from harm:2 6 3 the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), the Endangered Species Act
26526(ESA), and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).2 6 6
255 60-Day Notice of Intent to Sue for Failure to Perform Nondiscretionary
Duties Under the Clean Water Act from Marianne Engelman Lado & Hannah
Chang, Counsel, Earthjustice, to Lisa Jackson, Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency (Oct. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.earthjustice.org/sites/defaull/files/files/dispersantnotice_0.pdf.
256 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006).
257 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(4) (2006 & Supp. VI).
258 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Yost, 919 F.2d 27, 29-30 (5th Cir. 1990)
(upholding the "sheen test").
259 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).
260 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)-(3).
261 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b).
262 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006) ("[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action
on his[/her] own behalf . .. against any person . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an
order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation.").
263 KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41308, THE 2010 OIL
SPILL: CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER WILDLIFE LAWS 1 (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41308.pdf.
264 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (2006).
265 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2006).
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These statutes "apply to the oil spill from a well located
approximately 50 miles off the coast of Louisiana" through the
jurisdictional reach established in the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act.2 6 7
The MBTA "makes it unlawful 'by any means or in any
manner' to take, kill, or attempt to take or kill 'any migratory bird,
any part, nest, or egg of any such bird."' 268 It also operates under a
regime of strict liability, which means that "instead of having to
show that defendants knew they were committing a particular act,
the prosecution only has to show that an act happened. Under strict
liability, actors are liable for a violation regardless of what they
knew or what they meant to do. It is the easiest standard under
which to prosecute." 269 Additionally, while "the original purpose
of the MBTA was to protect birds from hunting, it has long been
used to prosecute any sort of taking of birds, including when they
die from contamination." 270 Prosecution under such statutes could
result in fines being levied against BP, which could range from
$15,000 per act (the statutory fine allowed under the MBTA) to
perhaps "twice the pecuniary losses incurred by anyone as a result
of the spill" (if a court applied the Alternative Fines Act, which
imposes harsher penalties).
The ESA and MMPA prohibit actions that harass or kill either
listed species (in the case of the ESA, which means species that are
listed as either threatened or endangered) or marine mammals (in
the case of the MMPA).272 Unlike the MBTA, criminal
prosecutions under both the ESA and the MMPA have a mens rea
requirement for prosecution, which means that "[b]oth require
proof that a defendant knew it was committing the act of causing
an oil spill."273 Civilrosecutions under the ESA have the same
intent requirement. Under the MMPA, however, a civil
prosecution "has no such requirement. Civil violations occur if a
person 'violates any provision of this subchapter or of any permit
266 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1423h (2006).
267 ALEXANDER, supra note 263, at 1-2.
268 Id. at 1.
269 Id. at 4-5.
270 Id. at 5.
271 Id. at 8-9 (discussing the range of available penalties under the MBTA).
272 Id. at 1.
273 Id. at 9.
274 Id. at 3.
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or regulation issued thereunder."' 275 Successful claims under
either the MMPA or ESA generally result in the imposition of
fines, which can reach $11,000 per violation under the MMPA 276
and up to $50,000 total under the ESA.277 The Obama
Administration has indicated that it is pursuing claims under the
ESA, the MMPA, and the MBTA.
Enforcement actions under the statutes cited above all provide
potential avenues for increased fines and payments by BP, which
would provide avenues for claimants to have access to more funds
that are potentially not capped by the $20 billion GCCF. They
would also provide avenues for money that does not rely on future
profits from offshore drilling by BP, which is the current source of278funding for the GCCF. While the statutes themselves do not
specify where all money from them should go, the Oil Spill
Pollution Fund notes that "fines and civil penalties under OPA, the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Deepwater Port Act, and
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act" are used as a source
of funding for the OSLTF. The OSLTF has typically received
between $4 and $7 million per year from these types of penalty
deposits, but penalties in the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill could vastly dwarf these amounts.279 As of yet, the
Obama Administration has not stated specifically what it would do
with money collected from these types of enforcement actions,
though the Senate recently passed a bill requiring money from
CWA fines to be spent on projects to restore the Gulf Coast
environment and economy. The Obama Administration chose to
pursue these CWA actions through MDL No. 2179, but is not part
of the proposed class settlement discussed previously.2 8 0
275 Id. at 4 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1375(a)(1) (2006)).
276 Id.
277 Id. at 8.
278 Trust Agreement between BP Exploration & Production, Inc., supra note
19 1; Jim Efstathiou, Jr., BP Spill Fund to be Backed by Future Drilling Revenue,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 11, 2010, 6:10 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-
08-11 lbp-spill-victims-fund-will-be-backed-by-future-revenue-from-oil-
drilling.html.
279 The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, NAT'L POLLUTION FUNDS CTR., U.S.
COAST GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/About NPFC/osltf.asp (last updated
Feb. 22, 2012).
280 See Schwartz, supra note 242:
"The agreement does not include the biggest plaintiff in the BP case:
the federal government. Nor does it include the state and local
governments along the coast, which are also suing. The federal
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IV. JUSTICE CONCERNS WITH EMPLOYMENT AND WORKERS
The BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill significantly affected
employment in the Gulf Coast region. This Part focuses on those
employment impacts and on the safety, training, and compensation
issues facing the most vulnerable workers in the context of the
spill: cleanup workers and oil rig workers.
A. Employment Loss and Opportunities
The BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill occurred in an area
already suffering from several layers of historical harms, including
a heavy reliance on the oil industry and the resulting
environmental damage, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and its
effects on the area's population and economy, and the recession.
These factors combined to significantly impact the makeup of the
work force following the oil spill. Job seekers rushed to the Gulf
Coast region seeking employment in the cleanup efforts:
emergency personnel with specialized training offered specific
skills and knowledge relating to disaster relief, oil rig workers and
other Gulf Coast residents who lost their jobs as a result of the spill
looked to replace lost wages and hasten the area's recovery, and
the nation's unemployed responded to the promise of temporary
work. This Section examines the economic state of the region prior
to the spill and its positive and negative impacts on industries and
employment.
1. Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Gulf Employment
The Gulf Coast was still recovering from the destruction
caused by Hurricane Katrina when the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill occurred. Changes in employment in the Gulf Coast region
after Hurricane Katrina are important because this information
may help predict future changes in employment in the Gulf Coast
region in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
because the region that suffered the most damage after Hurricane
Katrina is now poised to bear the brunt of the damage from the oil
government stands to recover billions of dollars in environmental fines,
but the extent to which the Justice Department is involved in
negotiations with BP is unclear."
See also Bruce Alpert, Senate Passes $109 Billion Transportation Bill, Including
BP Fines Provision, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/03/senatepasses109_billion-tran.
html.
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spill. With both the hurricane and the oil spill, vulnerable
populations in this area face two separate environmental justice
events which threaten to become cumulative in their effect.
In August of 2005, Hurricane Katrina inflicted serious
damage in the Gulf Coast areas of Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
around 1.5 million people aged sixteen and older evacuated as a
direct result of the flooding and property damage accompanying
the storm.281 The demographic composition of the evacuees
represented the affected area's population fairly well. However,
only an estimated 73% of evacuees returned to the county where
283
they lived prior the hurricane. Twenty-three percent of evacuees
from Louisiana, 11% of evacuees from Mississippi, and 5% of
evacuees from Alabama had not returned to their states of origin
by late 2006.284 The varying levels of return to the region led to
changes in the demographic composition of the area now hit
hardest by the oil spill. The BLS found white and Asian
populations most likely to return, each with more than 80%
returning to the same county they inhabited before the
hurricane.285 Only 72.2% of Hispanic populations and a mere
53.8% of black populations returned.286 In August 2010 Nielson
News reported that New Orleans had become "older, wealthier and
less diverse" since Hurricane Katrina because "[a]cross New
Orleans, the storm decimated downscale, African-American-
dominated sectors. The eastern part of the city in low-lying areas
took the brunt of the flooding, and members of these segments
were least able to return to New Orleans."2 8 7 Renters with fewer
ties to the area and less incentive to return and rebuild inhabited
many of the low-income areas affected by the storm.288 As a
281 Jeffrey A. Groen & Anne E. Polivka, Hurricane Katrina Evacuees: Who
They Are, Where They Are, and How They Are Faring, 131 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
32,(2008), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2008/03/art3full.pdf.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 38.
284 Id. at 40.
285 Id. at 44.
286 Id.
287 Five Years After Katrina, New Orleans is Older, Wealthier and Less
Diverse, NIELSEN WIRE (Aug. 24, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/
nielsenwire/consumer/five-years-after-katrina-new-orleans-is-older-wealthier-
and-less-diverse/.
288 Id.
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result, some of the most vulnerable populations in the Gulf Coast
area relocated prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
The evacuees that did return to the counties they inhabited
before Hurricane Katrina faced a poor job market. Affected areas
had a 12.1% unemployment rate between October 2005 and
October 2006 compared to the national unemployment rate of
2894.7% during the same time period. Unemployment continued to
increase; in 2009 the national unemployment rate was 9.3%,290
and some Gulf Coast region states faced higher unemployment
rates: Alabama (11.2%), Florida (10.4%), Louisiana (7.1%),
Mississippi (9.2%), and Texas (7.5%).291
2. Industries Benefiting from the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
The massive cleanup efforts in the Gulf created new
employment opportunities in the hospitality and restaurant
292businesses. The influx of out-of-state cleanup workers proved
beneficial to other industries as well, such as movie theaters,293
clothing stores, grocery stores, and laundry services. Businesses
manufacturing oil cleanup materials and equipment also benefitted
from the spill. Gulf Coast companies like Granite Environment
in Florida (manufacturing booms for oil containment) and Clean
Beach Technologies in Texas (selling a Beach Restoration
SystemTM for removal of tar from beach sand) received increased
295business as a result of the spill. The demand for cleanup
materials surpassed local availability, and businesses like
289 Groen & Polivka, supra note 281, at 45.
290 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER POPULATION SURVEY,
EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION BY AGE,
SEX, AND RACE, 2009 ANNUAL AVERAGES 1 (2010), available at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/1f/aa2009/pdf/cpsaat3.pdf.
291 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LOCAL AREA UNEMPLOYMENT
STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL
POPULATION BY SEX, RACE, HISPANIC OR LATINO ETHNICITY, MARITAL STATUS,
AND DETAILED AGE, 2009 ANNUAL AVERAGES 1, 17, 32, 42, 72 (2010), available
at http://www.bls.gov/lau/tablel4full09.pdf.
292 Dawn Kawamoto, BP Oil Spill Creates a Wave of New Jobs, Takes
Others Under, DAILYFINANCE (June 1, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/oil-spill-jobs/19495921/.
293 L.B. Woodgate, Gulf Oil Spill Cleanup Jobs and Employment
Opportunities, HELIUM (July 28, 2010), http://www.helium.com/items/1905237-
gulf-oil-spill-cleanup-jobs-and-employment-opportunities.
294 Kawamoto,.supra note 292.
295 Woodgate, supra note 293.
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California-based Oceans Therapy Solutions Corporation, which
builds centrifuges to remove oil from water, also experienced
increased sales.296 Oceanographers, marine specialists, and
chemists had increased opportunities assisting BP and the EPA in
the Gulf region.297 Jobs in civil construction, risk management,
298
and communications were also available.
However, these benefits likely were not distributed equally.
An NAACP investigation found that minority "[clommunity
members and business owners [of color] have been locked out of
access to contracts for cleanup and other opportunities related to
addressing this disaster."299 According to the Federal Procurement
Data System, on July 9th, 2010 a total of $53 million had been
awarded in federal contracts. Approximately 4.8% of those
contract resources, representing $2.2 million, were awarded to
small businesses the Federal Procurement Data System labeled as
disadvantaged.301 Businesses owned by women received 4.2% of
federal contracts.302 Eighteen of the 212 vendors with contracts
were minority-owned, and only two of these vendors were owned
by African Americans.303 This led NAACP President Benjamin
Jealous to articulate concern that "contractors of color are not
receiving equal consideration for opportunities to participate in
mitigation efforts."
304
3. Industries Negatively Impacted by the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill
Gulf Coast businesses like hotels and restaurants saw. a mixed
impact as a result of the oil spill. Some businesses, like those
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 NAACP, BP OIL DRILLING DISASTER-NAACP INVESTIGATION 7,
http://naacp.3cdn.net/9a056d54b418ffef9a-ylm6bee32.pdf; see also Brenton
Mock, Minorities See Little Green in BP Oil Spill Jobs, THE ROOT (July 13,
2010, 6:59 AM), http://www.theroot.com/views/minorities-see-little-green-bp-
oil-spill-jobs (explaining that minorities did not receive much of the business
opportunity).
300 Mock, supra note 299.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Letter from Benjamin Todd Jealous, President & CEO, NAACP, to Tony
Hayward, CEO, British Petroleum (July 10, 2010), available at
http://www.imdiversity.com/Villages/Careers/special/naacp-bp-spill071 0.asp.
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servicing tourism, lost business, while others saw an increase in
patronage due to the influx of workers and regulators responding
to the spill.305 Restaurants serving Gulf Coast seafood and seafood
processing businesses suffered as a result of fishing closures and306public concerns about oil contamination. Beachfront property
rental owners, recreational fishing outfitters and guides, and boat
operators also saw decreased sales.307 Small businesses are
especially vulnerable to the changes resulting from the oil spill,
and the Gulf Coast fishing industry has suffered significantly even
though all closed fishing areas eventually reopened as of April 19,
2011.308 The oil industry itself, and the workers it employs, were
impacted by the negative publicity and inability to continue
drilling.
Some sources suggest that impacts on the Gulf Coast fishing
industry have a disproportionate effect on African-American and
Southeast Asian populations.309 Plaquemines Parish, a
predominantly African-American area, has historically been the
focal point of the Gulf Coast oyster fishing industry. Many
oyster fishermen lost their boats and their homes to Hurricane
Katrina,311 and by the time the Deepwater Horizon oil began to
reach the oyster beds, there were between fifty and seventy-five
African-American fishermen in the area.3 12 When unable to work
because of closed fishing areas between May 1 and May 15,313
fishermen claimed up to $5000 per month from BP. This claim,
however, is significantly less than the $10,000 to $40,000 a month
they made when fishing.314 Few of the African-American oyster
fishermen have diplomas beyond high school, and some do not
305 Kawamoto, supra note 292.
306 Arbuckle, supra note 234.
307 Id.
308 Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill: Closure Information, NOAA FISHERIES
SERV., http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/Closurelnformation.htm (last updated Apr.
3, 2012).
309 Julie Weiss, The Gulf Oil Spill: An Environmental Justice Disaster,
TEACHING TOLERANCE (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.tolerance.org/blog/gulf-oil-
spill-environmental-justice-disaster.
310 Brentin Mock, Black Gulf Fishers Face a Murky Future, THE RoOT (May
25, 2010, 11:54 PM), http://www.theroot.com/views/invisible-fishermen-oil-
spill.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
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know how to read.315 Oyster fishing is a way of life that is taught
and continued within families, but that sort of education offers few
opportunities outside of the industry. 316
Vietnamese shrimp and crab fishermen around Biloxi,
Mississippi, also felt impacts of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill. Of the approximately 7500 individuals of Vietnamese
descent in the area, approximately 2000 individuals were
employed in jobs impacted by the spill.318 Initially, BP only
advertised compensation programs in English, and the language
barrier may have prevented some eligible individuals from
319
applying for aid. BP eventually printed literature in more than
one language and some translators were made available.3 2 0
According to Kaitlin Truong of Asian Americans for Change,
however, the Vietnamese fishing population still harbored
concerns because "[t]hey were left -out during Katrina, and they're
afraid [they're] going to be left out again."3 2
To counteract some of these negative impacts on the fishing
industry,.the BP Vessels of Opportunity program hired Gulf Coast
322fishermen and their boats to work on the oil spill cleanup. The
program targeted those unable to work as a result of the spill to
provide temporary employment until. the areas are re-opened to
fishing. According to RestoreTheGulf.goV, a total of 29,705
personnel had responded as of August 28, 2010.324 This statistic
includes the crews of the 5059 boats and sixty-four aircraft
involved in cleanup efforts, but reports of the number of boats in
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Rick Jervis, Gulf of Mexico's Vietnamese Fishing Community Hit Hard,
USA TODAY (July 8, 2010, 9:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/
nation/2010-07-08-BP-claims-sideN.htm.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Fact Sheet on BP Vessels of Opportunity Program, BP (July 7, 2010),
http://www.bp.comiiveassets/bp-internet/globalbp/globalbp-uk-english/inciden
t-response/STAGING/local assets/downloads-pdfs/factsheet bp-vesselsjofop
portunity-program.pdf.
323 Vessels of Opportunity Update, BP (Aug. 16, 2010),
http://bp.concerts.com/gom/vesselsofopportunityupdate 160810.htm.
324 Operations and Ongoing Response, RESTORETHEGULF.GOV (Aug. 28,
2010), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/28/operations-and-
ongoing-response-august-28-201 0.
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the Vessels of Opportunity program vary, with some sources
estimating around 3000 participating vessels.325 BP reports on its
website that the Vessels of Opportunity participants engaged in
work like "supporting skimming, tending and maintaining boom,
collecting sheen and light oil in shallower waters, finding and
removing tar balls from the water, and transportation of supplies,
personnel and wildlife." 326 The program's need for vessels did not
match interest, and those working in the program longest were
often cut in order to allow new community members to take
part.327
All workers, including those hired through the Vessels of
Opportunity program, were first hired by a BP contractor, as
discussed in more depth in the following Section, and attended
training sessions as required b 8 the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA). In addition to worker training,
all boats in the rogram passed a dockside examination by the U.S.
Coast Guard. The Vessels of Opportunity program provides
access to translators who speak Spanish, Vietnamese, and
330Khmer. During training, program participants received
compensation at a rate of twenty-five dollars per hour for either
eight or twelve hour days. 33 Crews on vessels were compensated
according to length of vessel rather than number of workers, and
payment ranged from $1200 per twenty-four hours for boats less
than thirty feet to $3000 er twenty-four hours for boats larger
than sixty-five feet long. The owner of the vessel received all
payments and was subsequently responsible for distributing
payment to the crew.333 Boats were also being used by the state of
Louisiana and by BP-contracted Oil Spill Response
334Organizations.
Vessels of Opportunity programs in Alabama, Florida, and
325 Id.; Fact Sheet on BP Vessels of Opportunity Program, supra note 322.
326 Fact Sheet on BP Vessels of Opportunity Program, supra note 322.
327 Vessels of Opportunity Update, supra note 323.
328 Current Training Requirements for the Gulf Oil Spill, OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (July 21, 2010),
http://www.osha.gov/oilspills/training.html.
329 Fact Sheet on BP Vessels of Opportunity Program, supra note 322.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
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Mississippi officially ended on September 15, 2010, but the
program was still active in Louisiana for some time thereafter.3 3 5
BP has spent more than $500 million on the program, which
functioned with the expectation that fisherman would return to
336their regular jobs after being dismissed. However, although the
government re-opened eighty percent of Gulf Coast fishing areas
by early fall, only twenty percent of the number of shrimp fishing
boats working the area in 2009 had returned to work as of
September 15. The publicity surrounding the oil spill drove
down the price of Gulf Coast seafood due to safety concerns, and
fishing is consequently no longer profitable for some in the
area. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is in charge of
safety programs for fish and related products, and according to the
agency's website, "[a]lthough crude oil has the potential to taint
seafood with flavors and odors caused by exposure to hydrocarbon
chemicals, the public should not be concerned about the safety of
seafood in stores at this time."3 3 9 The FDA also stated that "[fWish
and shellfish harvested from areas reopened or unaffected by the
340
closures are considered safe to eat." Seafood contaminated with
oil is not a primary health concern because the taste of oil is
detectable at levels of contamination lower than levels that pose a
341health concern.
Dispersants found in seafood products may pose a more
342
significant risk than oil contamination. For this reason, the areas
335 Mark R. Kent, BP Ends Vessels of Opportunity Program, PRESS-
REGISTER (Mobile, Ala.) (Sept. 15, 2010, 6:16 PM),
http://blog.al.com/live/2010/09/bp-shelves-vesselsof-opportun.html; see
Alarming Trend: Fewer Commercial Fishermen Can Afford to Fish, LA.
SEAFOOD NEWS (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.louisianaseafoodnews.com/
2010/09/15/alarming-trend-fewer-commercial-fishermen-can-afford-to-fish.
336 Kent, supra note 335.
337 Alarming Trend: Fewer Commercial Fishermen Can Afford to Fish, supra
note 335.
338 Id.
339 Gulf of Mexico Spill Update, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 2, 2011),
http://web.archive.org/web/20100905063035/http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafe
ty/Product-Specificlnformation/Seafood/ucm210970 (accessed by searching for
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-Specificlnformation/
Seafood/ucm210970 in the Internet Archive index).
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 Questions and Answers on Dispersants, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants-qanda.html (last updated Oct. 15, 2011).
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sprayed with dispersants were closed to fishing.343 Dispersants
were last applied to the waters of the Gulf Coast on July 19, 2010,
and are specifically formulated to disperse and break down more
quickly than oil. 34 While this rapid breakdown is good news for
the fishing community, the viability of the fishing industry rests on
the willingness of the public to purchase Gulf Coast seafood.
According to NOAA Fisheries' Office of Science and Technology,
only 58.5 million pounds of shrimp came out of the Gulf Coast in
the first nine months of 2010 compared to an average from 2007 to
2009 of 86 million pounds for the same period.34 5
The long-term impact on the Gulf Coast fishing industry is
complicated to assess. On February 1, 2011, NOAA re-opened
more than 4000 square miles to fishing after extensive testing
prompted by the discovery of tar balls in nets intended to catch
346Royal Red Shrimp. On April 19, 2011 the 1041 square mile
area surrounding the Macondo well, which was the last area to
347
remain closed, was re-opened to all types of fishing. Some
sources suggest that the absence of fishing pressure during last
summer's extensive fishing closures may have increased
348populations of some seafood species such as white shrimp. Gulf
Coast fishermen enjoyed a five-day white shrimp fishing season in
April of 2011 because of the overabundance of the species.349
However, the resilience and abundance of seafood species is only
one part of the equation. Despite assurances from the FDA that
350Gulf Coast seafood is safe for consumption, there is not yet
343 Overview of Testing Protocol to Re-open Harvest Waters that Were
Closed in Response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, supra note 84.
344 Questions and Answers on Dispersants, supra note 342.
345 Shrimp Statistics, OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., NAT'L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., (Sept. 2011), http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/
stI/marketnews/doc45.txt.
346 BP Oil Spill: NOAA Re-opens Federal Waters to Royal Red Shrimp
Fishing, NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/bulletins/pdfs/201 I /FB I 1-
010 ReopeningRoyalRed-020211 .pdf.
347 Entire Gulf of Mexico Reopened to Fishing a Year After BP Spill, ENV'T
NEWS SERV. (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr20l1/2011-
04-19-01.html.
348 See Gulf Seafood Industry Sputters Back to Life, A Year After Oil Spill,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 18, 2011, 11:15 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-
oil-spill/index.ssf/2011/04/gulf-seafood-industry-sputters.html.
349 Id.
350 See Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Update, supra note 339.
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reliable data about whether the market for Gulf Coast seafood has
recovered; some businesses claim that they are still having trouble
with customers not trusting the safety of their seafood and that
sales remain down.35 1
Beyond the broader compensation provisions described in the
previous Part, there are a number of provisions focused on the
economic effects of the spill. Under the OPA, the responsible party
is liable for lost profits or earning capacity.352 Compensation is
administered through the OSLTF or the GCCF.3 5 3  The
requirements for eligibility for compensation under the OSLTF
are: (1) the damage was a result of a spill that occurred on or after
August 18, 1990; (2) the harms were caused by an oil spill; (3) the
oil spill affected or substantially threatened to affect navigable
waters of the United States; and (4) either the claim was presented
to the party responsible for the oil spill, a responsible party has not
been identified, the NPFC has solicited claims, or the claim falls
under the listed exceptions for removal cost claims.3 54 If all four
requirements are satisfied a claimant may submit a claim for
damages or removal costs. 55
Businesses and individuals filing claims for profit loss in
vulnerable industries like fishing and small businesses where the
long-term costs could not yet be accurately estimated were able to
receive expedited payments from the OSLTF or GCCF to cover
the loss of their first month's income.356 Other claimants who
were eligible for expedited payments include owners of coastal
rental properties, restaurants, charter boat businesses, fishermen
including shrimp and oyster harvesters, and seafood processing
357businesses. Before the GCCF was formed, BP established an
Immediate Action Claims Team to address these types of urgent
351 See Debbie Elliot, BP's Oil Slick Set to Spill into Courtroom, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (Feb. 16, 2012) http://www.npr.org/2012/02/16/146938630/bps-oil-slick-
set-to-spill-into-courtroom.
352 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-62 (2006 & Supp. IV).
353 See supra Part IIL.A-C.
354 OPA Claims Requirements, NAT'L POLLUTION FUNDS CTR., U.S. COAST
GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/claims/general-claimsrequirements.asp (last
updated Feb. 22, 2012).
355 Id.
356 See supra Part III.A.
357 Press Release, BP, BP Takes Action to Fast-Track Claims for Gulf Coast
Businesses (Aug. 3, 2010), available at http://www.bp.com/
genericarticle.do?categoryld=201 2968&contentld=7064163.
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loss of profits claims.358 The company also expanded the types of
claims covered to include tourist industries that operate near
359affected beaches. Receipt of these payments does not preclude
eligible claimants from filing more complete claims later on.360
Claims that did not fit within the categories eligible for
expedited payments were referred to the GCCF for claiming lost
361profits or lost wages. These deferred claimants included
restaurants, tourist attractions, owners of property that are not
located on oiled beaches, and seafood businesses outside of the
Gulf that purchase Gulf Coast products. 362
Both individuals and businesses can submit claims to the
363GCCF. The GCCF defines lost wages as a "loss of or reduction
in your ability to earn wages or income."364 Lost profits covers
temporary and permanent decreases in a business's capacity to
make money. According to the GCCF website, the GCCF fund
is intended to compensate losses that are the result of "injury,
destruction or loss of Real Property, Personal Property, or natural
resources due to the Spill" and the claimant does not need to be
"the owner of the damaged property or natural resources."366 In
order to be eligible for funds,. claimants must (1) "Identify the
specific Real Property, Personal Property or natural resources
injured, destroyed or lost due to the Spill" and (2) show loss of
"earnings or profits as a result of the injurg destruction or loss of
the specific property or natural resources."
Individuals who have received money from the fund and
continue to lose income are not precluded from filing additional
368
claims. Individuals who lost their jobs because of the spill and
have since accepted new employment at a lower pay rate can still
file claims for the discrepancy in earnings.369 The GCCF expands
358 Id.
359 Id.
360 See supra Part III.A-C.
361 Press Release, BP, supra note 357.
362 Id.
363 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 152, § 10 (Lost Profits and
Earning Capacity).
364 Id.
365 See id.
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 See id.
369 See id.
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compensation to include damage to the physical buildings that
house businesses and important tools of business like fishing
370boats. While these harms are not direct wage or profit losses,
they affect a claimant's ability to work and earn money. Expedited
payments are available under the GCCF.37 1 These expedited
payments may be important for environmental justice because
people who have not accumulated savings may have a greater need
for expedited compensation in order to support themselves
following a disaster.
Finally, BP established a $100 million fund specifically to
compensate oil rig workers who were out of work during the
moratorium.372 The Rig Worker Assistance Fund is administered
by the Gulf Coast Restoration and Protection Foundation.3 7 3 The
money is distributed in the form of grants based on applications.3 7 4
However, where rig workers have lost profits due to the
moratorium, BP may be able to argue that the actions of the federal
government are responsible for the losses.375 "BP officials have
insisted that they are not legally responsible for claims emanating
from the moratorium, and described the $100 million rig-worker
376fund as a good-will gesture." If the moratorium was the direct
cause of the lost wages rather than the oil spill, BP may not be
377liable for compensating oil rig workers. Despite concerns about
extensive layoffs under the deepwater drilling moratorium, oil rig
workers did not suffer significant loss of employment because oil
companies retained most of their skilled rig working employees to
370 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 152, § 9 (Damage to Real or
Personal Property).
371 See 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2006).
372 Tilove, supra note 147.
373 Press Release, BP, BP Fulfills Commitment to Assist Displaced Rig
Workers, Establishes $100 Million Fund Through Baton Rouge Foundation (July
30, 2010), available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryld=2
012968&contentId=7064072.
374 Id.
375 Thomas Catan & Dionne Searcey, Dispute Rages on BP Liability for
Wages, as Obama Pushes, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2010), http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB l0001424052748703627704575299153313210426.html.
376 Jonathan Tilove, Moratorium Claim Situation Varies Depending on
Whom You Talk To, and When, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 29, 2010, 10:22 PM),
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/06/moratorium
claim situation var.html.
377 Catan & Searcey, supra note 375.
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perform deferred maintenance on oil rigs.378
4. Long Term Gulf Coast Recovery Plan
Navy Secretary Ray Mabus issued a Long Term Recovery
Plan outlinin a proposed plan of action for recovery in the Gulf
Coast area. This plan has the potential to create new job
opportunities in cleanup and restoration, but some raised concerns
about the exclusion of minority groug s from both the planning
process and the proposed restoration. Non-profit groups, like
Bayou Interfaith Shared Community Organizing, in the areas hit
hardest by the spill "believe this plan does not give those
communities most vulnerable to disaster, be it an oil spill or a
deadly hurricane, a voice in the decision-making process."38 1
These groups allege that the plan fails to address the specific and
individualized needs of people and communities hit the hardest by
the oil spill and its aftermath, including "African-American fishers
in east Plaquemines Parish; the Pointe-Aux-Chien and Native
American tribes further west; and Cajuns Croatians, Vietnamese
and Cambodians across the entire coast." 38t
Those not happy with the plan indicated that the lack of
diversity "means that the plan does not have a clear picture of the
oil spill's victims." For example, the Houma Nation, a tribe
recognized by the state of Louisiana but not by the federal
government, was neither allowed input nor given acknowledgment
by the Long Term Recovery Plan. While the certainty and scope
of these concerns and allegations are uncertain, the fact that groups
have raised these concerns at all warrants further examination of
the development of the Long Term Recovery Plan.
378 See INTER-AGENCY ECON. REPORT, ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF THE DEEPWATER DRILLING MORATORIUM ON THE GULF COAST ECONOMY 6
(2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/
importedpdfs/extemal/content/document/2931/899311 /1/Drilling-moratorium
official-report 0915.pdf.
379 MABUS, supra note 96.
380 Brenton Mock, Oil Spill Recovery: Who Benefits?, THE ROOT (Sept. 30,
2010, 1:35 PM), http://www.theroot.comlviews/post-oil-spill-recovery-who-
benefits.
381 Id.
382 Id.
383 Id.
384 Id.
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B. Cleanup Workers
According to a report from the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an average of 46,271
people worked on various parts of the cleanup effort at its peak in
the eleventh week of the spill.385 As of the thirteenth week
following8 6he spill, that number was reduced to 29,390 cleanup
workers. In a September 30, 2010 statement, BP reported that
"approximately 20,000 people from BP staff, contractors,
governmental and industry empoyees and volunteers are at sites
providing ongoing response." BP divided the areas in which
workers perform response activities into four groups: offshore
(those on boats near the leak), near shore (those on boats operating
closer to shore performing activities like skimming or boom
handling), beach (those doing land-based activities), and
decontamination (those decontaminating response equipment and
388
vessels). A BP report on the monitoring of hazardous exposure
identified the main methods to prevent harm to the response
workers: engineerin, 9 administrative controls, and personal
protective equipment.
Assessing environmental justice in the context of cleanup
workers is complex. On the one hand, this work is sought-after
employment in a difficult economy. On the other hand, cleaning up
oil spill waste is risky work, and the people needing to take such
work may not have adequate options and protection. This Section
explores these complexities by discussing the vulnerable
populations involved in cleanup efforts, health and safety
concerns, training, and housing.
385 NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, NIOSH REPORT OF
DEEPWATER HORIZON RESPONSE/UNIFIED AREA COMMAND ILLNESS AND INJURY
DATA (APRIL 23 - JULY 27, 2010) (Aug. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/oilspillresponse/pdfs/NIOSHrot-
BPilnessAndlnjuryDataApril23-july27-2010.pdf [hereinafter NIOSH ILLNESS
AND INJURY DATA].
386 Id.
387 Personal Exposure Monitoring Results Summary, BP (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp-intemet/globalbp/globalbp-uk-english/inciden
t response/STAGING/localassets/downloads-pdfs/HealthMonitoringSumma
ryReport_30_September-201 0.pdf.
388 Id.
389 See id.
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1. Vulnerable Populations Involved in Cleanup Efforts
Three main categories of vulnerable populations were
employed following the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: the
previously unemployed, the homeless, and prisoners. The majority
of the populations discussed here were involved in land-based
beach cleanup. Finding reliable information on the precise
demographics of the people performing beach cleanup was
particularly difficult because of the insufficient collection and
publication of data. A CNN article reported that BP was paying
beach workers $18 per hour, while supervisors made $32 per
hour.390 Most employees were hired by contractors rather than by
BP, and it is unclear whether the quoted wages include those
workers. What follows is a discussion of the three previously
identified groups: the unemployed, the homeless, and prisoners.
Many of the individuals BP hired to clean up the beaches in
the Gulf Coast from Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana were
already unemployed before the oil spill. BP set up a program in
partnership with state-run unemployment programs, and many of
the individuals hired to participate in cleanup efforts filed for
392
unemployment prior to the spill. In fact "even before the
cleanup worker program kicked off, Alabama workers could fill
out an online job application for.potential oil clean up jobs."393
Alabama began soliciting the unemployed to start cleanup training
on May 12, 2010.394 Approximately 4500 workers were recruited
395through these Gulf Coast unemployment programs.
The full extent of previously unemployed individuals working
as beach cleanup workers is unknown because beyond the June 8,
2010 CNN article, little information is available. Due to the high
number of previously unemployed individuals in the region,
however, it is likely that the previously unemployed filled many
cleanup jobs. Some news and blog sources raised serious concerns
over the education level of those entering into contracts to perform
390 Catherine Clifford, BP Hires the Unemployed for Cleanup, CNN MONEY
(June 8, 2010, 12:42 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/08/smallbusiness/
bphiring-unemployedlindex.htm.
391 See id.
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Id.
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cleanup work.396 Reports of individuals unable to read and write,
requiring community members to read employment contracts to
them, raise concerns about how many other illiterate workers
entered into similar contracts without assistance.3 9 7 The total
number of cleanup workers is estimated in the tens of thousands,
and it is not known how many of these workers were
undereducated or previously unemployed.
The eligibility requirements for receipt of unemployment
benefits are similar in all of the Gulf Coast states. All five states
require that the claimant was employed for a percentage of their
base 3p8eriod and meet certain minimum earnings during that
time. Depending on how long temporary oil spill cleanup jobs
last and how much they pay, accepting a job performing cleanup
work might make some previously unemployed workers ineligible
for unemployment benefits. In Louisiana, an unemployment
benefits claimant can be partially unemployed, so a part-time
cleanup worker might still be able to claim unemployment while
399
employed in an oil cleanup job. Even within the unemployment
benefits system, there is an unequal distribution of resources. The
weekly maximum unemployment benefit varies by state. This
means that workers in Mississippi and Alabama are at a
disadvantae, with a maximum weekly benefit payment of less
than $270, while unemployed workers in Texas can collect up
396 Eric Noll, BP Oil Spill: Lafitte Bayou Fears What Incoming Oil Could Do
to Community, ABC NEWS (July 13, 2010, 2:53 PM),
http://blogs.abcnews.com/theworldnewser/2010/07/bp-oil-spill-lafitte-bayou-
fears-what-incoming-oil-could-do-to-community.html.
397 Id.
398 Unemployment Insurance Benefits Information, TEX. WORKFORCE
COMM'N., http://www.twc.state.tx.us/ui/bnfts/claimant1.html#qualify (last
updated Oct. 24, 2012) [hereinafter TEX. WORKFORCE COMM'N.]; Benefit
Eligibility Requirements, Miss. DEP'T OF EMP'T SEC.,
http://www.mdes.ms.gov/Home/UnemploymentServices/BenefitEligibilityRequi
rements.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Miss. DEP'T OF EMP'T
SEC.]; Frequently Asked Questions from Claimants Concerning Benefits, LA.
WORKFORCE COMM'N., http://www.laworks.net/FAQs/FAQ-UI
ClaimantBenefits.asp (last updated Jan. 7, 2010) [hereinafter LA. WORKFORCE
COMM'N.]; Frequently Asked Questions-Filing a Claim, FLA. DEP'T OF ECON.
OPPORTUNITY, http://www.floridajobs.org/frequently-asked-questions-
directory/frequently-asked-questions/category/200e7fl 0-8aOe-4409-a9ff-
84d011 a3fae6 (last visited July 23, 2012); Claim and Benefits FAQ, ALA. DEP'T
OF INDUS. RELATIONS, http://dir.alabama.gov/uc/claims.aspx (last visited Dec.
16, 2012) [hereinafter Ala. Dep't of Indus. Relations].
399 LA. WORKFORCE COMM'N., supra note 398.
400 Miss. DEP'T OF EMP'T SEC., supra note 398; ALA. DEP'T OF INDUS.
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to $426 per week.40 1
Disaster Unemployment Assistance is also available for
individuals who have lost their jobs as a direct result of a federally-
declared disaster and do not qualify to receive regular
unemployment benefits.402 However, claimants must apply for
Disaster Unemployment Assistance within thirty days after the
declaration of a major disaster.403 The U.S. Commerce Secretary
declared a fishery disaster at the end of May 2010, which means
that the deadline to apply expired at the end of June 2010.404
People who lost their jobs after June 2010 were therefore not
eligible to receive Disaster Unemployment Assistance.
In addition to unemployed workers, homeless populations405
have been sources of labor for disaster cleanup. These jobs are
not always highly sought-after because they are temporary, often
involve long hours, and are typically dangerous. In early 2010,
crews that dealt with the cleanup after severe flooding in
Tennessee drew heavily from area homeless shelters.
Employment agencies in Tennessee went so far as to seek workers
in local shelters.4 0 7
The extent to which this type of recruitment happened in the
Gulf was unclear, but in the aftermath of the oil spill, Gulf Coast
homeless shelters received an influx of new residents looking for
jobs working on cleanup.408 However, due to area unemployment
RELATIONS, supra note 398.
401 TEX. WORKFORCE COMM'N., supra note 398.
402 Disaster Unemployment Assistance, EMP'T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/disaster.asp (last
updated July 23, 2010).
403 Disaster Unemployment Assistance, FLA. DEP'T OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY,
http://www.floridajobs.org/office-directory/division-of-workforce-
services/unemployment-programs/disaster-unemployment-assistance (last visited
Dec. 16, 2012).
404 Fishery Disaster Declared in the Wake of Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, May 24, 2010, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spilllindex.ssf/
2010/05/fishery-disaster declared in w.html.
405 Natalie Wendt, Homeless Workers Want to Clean Up Oil Spill,
CHANGE.ORG (August 18, 2010, 6:30 AM), http://homelessness.change.org/
blog/view/homeless_workerswantto-clean-up-oil-spill; see also David
Helms, Seeking Oil Spill Work, Homeless Fill Gulf Coast Shelters, PRESS-
REGISTER (Mobile, Ala.) (July 30, 2010, 8:07 AM),
http://blog.al.com/ive/2010/07/seeking-oil-spill-workhomeles.html.
406 Wendt, supra note 405.
407 Id.
408 Helms, supra note 405.
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rates before the spill, the temporary suspension of much of the
fishing industry, and the arrival of workers from around the
country 9there was heavy competition for cleanup jobs in the Gulf
Coast. Many of the other job seekers had more experience and
specialized training and those reporting on the issue found that
410
many of those filling the shelters were not being hired. Instead,
they were finding overcrowded homeless shelters.4 1 1
Some sources reported that BP was also using prison labor to
clean the oiled beaches, although BP neither confirms nor denies
412these allegations. Reports indicate that prisoners were not
forced to participate in oil cleanup, but that they risked losing any
"good time" earned towards early release and ultimately could
413
spend more time in prison if they refused to take part.
According to reports, some inmates in the work release program
did not receive pay for their labor while others made up to forty
cents an hour. If BP was using prison labor, they were
benefitting from a cheap and reliable source of labor as well as
receiving tax benefits. Assuming prisoners were performing
cleanup work, it is unclear the extent to which they received
instruction regarding the dangers associated with handling oil or
knew that they could opt out of the dangerous work. Area residents
were reportedly upset at the prospect of a prison work force taking
jobs away from locals whose livelihoods had suffered from the
spill.416
Further, the participation of prisoners in the beach cleanup
efforts may also contribute disproportionate representation of
409 Wendt, supra note 405.
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 Abe Louise Young, BP Hires Prison Labor to Clean Up Spill While
Coastal Residents Struggle, THE NATION (July 21, 2010),
http://www.thenation.com/article/37828/bp-hires-prison-labor-clean-spill-while-
coastal-residents-struggle. The reporter based her assertion of the use of prison
labor on reports from local residents and by travelling to the Lafourche Parish
Work Release Center. At the work release center, Young reported that "[m]en
were returning from a long day of shoveling oil-soaked sand into black trash
bags in the sweltering heat. Wearing BP shirts, jeans and rubber boots (nothing
identifying them as inmates), they arrived back at the jail in unmarked white
vans, looking dog tired." Id.
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Id.
416 Id.
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people of color in cleanup work. For example, in Grand Isle,
Louisiana, a predominantly white area, African Americans were
over-represented among cleanup workers to such an extent that
NAACP president Ben Jealous sent a letter to the CEO of BP
questioning why cleanup companies targeted African-American
men to work such difficult and dangerous jobs. According to
the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, in
June 2011, 69.3% of 'the state adult correctional population was
black and 94% was male, and drawing from such a population
418
could potentially increase any racial disparity. While reports of
the use of prison labor are sparse, research turned up nothing to
counter these reports. Those reporting on the use of prison labor
write that official responses have indicated uncertainty but not
denial.419 The use of prison labor is another area in which
information is lacking but necessary to assess environmental
justice concerns.
2. Health and Safety Concerns Regarding Cleanup Workers
Cleanup workers faced the general health and safety risks
associated with working with oil, health and safety risks specific to
oil spill workers, and issues with the adequacy of training and
housing. First, exposure to oil carries with it a host of risks. The
primary danger to workers is the result of a mixture of
hydrocarbons and designated light, medium, and heavy chemicals
in the crude oil.420 There are two main ways in which workers are
exposed to the chemicals: breathing them in and direct skin
contact.421 The lighter chemicals generally evaporate within
417 Letter from Benjamin Todd Jealous, President & CEO, NAACP, to Tony
Hayward, CEO, British Petroleum, supra note 304. It should be noted that the
claims made by Mr. Jealous were his own, and those claims have not been
otherwise substantiated.
418 CORR. SERVS., LA. DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORR., DEMOGRAPHIC
PROFILES OF THE ADULT CORRECTIONAL POPULATION (2011), available at
http://www.corrections.state.Ia.us/wp-content/uploads/stats/2a.pdf.
419 Young, supra note 412.
420 See OIL SPILL CLEANUP INITIATIVE, NAT'L INST. OF ENVTL. HEALTH SCIs.,
SAFETY AND HEALTH AWARENESS FOR OIL SPILL CLEANUP WORKERS 35-36, 38-
39 (2010), available at http://www.osha.gov/Publications/OilSpillBooklet
05.11 v4.pdf (describing crude oil's evaporation and degradation and the various
health hazards associated with exposure to different hydrocarbons and chemicals
throughout these processes).
421 Id. at 40 (explaining the dermatitis hazard and the hazard of oily
droplets/oily particles in the air during cleanup).
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twenty-four to forty-eight hours of the sill, leaving behind the
medium and heavy parts in the water. This means that those
exposed to fresher oil experience a much higher risk than those
leading efforts on the shore because many of the hazardous
components have evaporated by the time the oil reaches land.4 2 3
Even after the oil has weathered and formed into tar balls, cleanup
workers can suffer rashes as a result of contact.4 2 4
The lack of clear information regarding the long-term effects
of oil exposure on human health complicates efforts to address
potential concerns. An analysis of exposure of cleanup workers
conducted by NIOSH in May of 1991 was unable to quantify the
negative effects associated with oil exposure following the Exxon
425Valdez spill. Part of the reason for the absence of. proper
analysis was a lack of information: "[a]n unsuccessful attempt was
made to conduct a systematic, record-based review of health and
injury data in the field. This was not pursued after the 1989
cleanup effort had ended.' Though unable to encompass the
whole scope of health and injury data, the report did manage to
turn up some useful information. Upon examining workers
compensation claims in Alaska, NIOSH found that there were a
total of 1811 workers' compensation claims in 1989 directly
427
related to the spill. The record attributed 800 worker injuries, or
44% of total reported injuries, to "strains/sprains, cuts/lacerations,
or contusions;" 265 (14.6%) of reported injuries were attributed to
bronchitis-type respiratory injuries; and forty-four injuries (2.4%)
were attributed to dermatitis. While this list is not exhaustive
and may not fully encompass all of the injuries caused by exposure
to oil, it provides some indication of the type of oil-induced
injuries for which compensation was sought immediately
following the Exxon Valdez oil spill. In addition to describing the
types of injuries, the report also determined that some of the
injuries and dangers came from workers choosing to take off parts
422 Id.
423 Id.
424 Id. at 42-43.
425 See NAT'L INST. OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, HEALTH HAZARD
EVALUATION EXXONIVALDEZ ALASKA OIL SPILL (1991) [hereinafter
EXXON/VALDEZ HHE], available at http://http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/reports/
pdfs/1 989-0200-211 l.pdf.
426 Id. at 2.
427 Id. at 23.
428 Id.
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of their protective equipment due to heat or discomfort.429 The
available records report that tests only found trace concentrations
of dangerous chemicals.430 Other reports directly counter this
finding and determined that exposure to oil had significant health
effects on Exxon Valdez cleanup workers.4 3 1
Beyond these NIOSH reports, OSHA itemized twenty
different potential hazards to workers dealing with an oil spill, but432
acknowledged that the list was not exhaustive. OSHA utilized
requisite training as one of the primary methods to ensure the
safety of cleanup workers, whether that training was administered
by OSHA, BP, state agencies, or any number of contractors. In
addition, BP and other agencies monitored worker exposure to
certain chemicals and hazardous materials. Finally, a record was
being kept of injuries and illnesses suffered by workers, thoufh the
accuracy and completeness of this record are unconfirmed.4 3
At the peak of cleanup efforts, BP employed up to 200
"industrial hygienists and technicians" to monitor worker exposure
across three different work areas. 434 BP used varying methods for
ensuring proper sampling of hazardous material. Some monitoring
personnel used tools to measure the quality of the air and other
materials encountered by workers.4 3 5 Alternatively, monitoring
personnel took samples directly from response workers, although
these tests often required subsequent analysis to get results and
therefore reduced the possibility of immediate action to avoid
. 436
serious health consequences.
429 Id. at 24.
430 Id.
431 Drew Griffin, Critics Call Valdez Cleanup a Warning for Gulf Workers,
CNN (July 8, 2010, 10:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/07/07/
oil.spill.valdez.workers/index.html (reporting that 6722 of the 11,000 workers
had gotten sick). In addition, the author indicates that Exxon has the medical
records of ill or injured workers, but those records have been sealed to protect
worker privacy. Id.
432 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
TRAINING MARINE OIL SPILL RESPONSE WORKERS UNDER OSHA's HAZARDOUS
WASTE OPERATIONS AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE STANDARD (2001) [hereinafter
OIL SPILL HAZWOPERI, available at http://www.osha.govfPublications/
3172/3172.html (listing items such as drowning, slips, biohazardous debris, and
fatigue).
433 Personal Exposure Monitoring Results Summary, BP, supra note 387.
434 Id.
435 Id.
436 Id.
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When analyzing response workers' risk of exposure, BP
primarily operated based on the guideline that any amount of
hydrocarbons in the air over 100 parts per million constitutes
437
excessive exposure. OSHA notes, however, that "even if air
sampling shows no detectable levels or very low levels of volatile
organic compounds (VOCs), there still may be health effects
present."438 Further, despite a finding of dangerous levels by BP
on only one occasion, reports have surfaced of vessel-based
cleanup workers and former fishermen who became quite ill after
performing work in the employ of BP.4 3 9 There are also anecdotal
reports of injuries sustained because workers were not allowed to
wear proper safety equipment or were not outfitted with the proper
safety equipment.
BP's response and health mitigation efforts operated in
441
tandem with the Unified Area Command (UAC), though an
examination of the UAC website does not make clear which entity
is fully responsible for worker safety. According to BP, only one
of the samples analyzed registered beyond the acceptable OSHA
Personal Exposure Limit for response workers and BP further
asserts that this result was an isolated incident. However, even
if the company's statements are true, they do not necessarily
reflect the extent of the injuries or dangers to cleanup workers. For
example, OSHA had reported over 739 heat related illness
incidents in cleanup workers. OSHA also stated that it has
implemented heat stress plans and work/rest requirements at the
437 Id.
438 Hazards Associated with Oil Cleanup Operations, OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.osha.gov/
oilspills/hazards.html#crude (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
439 Nicole Santa Cruz & Julie Cart, Oil Cleanup Workers Report Illness, L.A.
TIMES, May 26, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/26/nation/la-na-oil-
workers-sick-20100526; Personal Exposure Monitoring Results Summary, BP,
supra note 387.
440 See Former BP Cleanup Worker Exposes Staged Photo Ops, Toxic
Working Conditions, and Covert Ops, (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=0DuPraOJaDg. (accompanying video describing a scenario in which a
worker was instructed not to wear a protective mask).
441 See generally Technical Reports and Studies, BP, http://www.bp.com/
sectiongenericarticle800.do?categoryld=9040049&contentd=7067598 (last
visited Dec. 16, 2012).
442 Personal Exposure Monitoring Results Summary, BP, supra note 387.
443 Gulf Oil Response and Heat, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.osha.gov/oilspills/heatstress.htm (last visited
Dec. 16, 2012).
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cleanup sites.444 In addition, OSHA promulgated a number of
other plans in order to properly protect workers based on the
events of this and other spills. 45
NIOSH compiled statistics on reported injuries suffered
cleanup workers based on data from OSHA and other sources.
As of July 27, 2010, NIOSH reported a total of 2130 injuries or447illnesses related to spill cleanup. Only ten of those injuries
affected BP employees while 2050 were reported from contractors
hired to do cleanup work.448 NIOSH divided the recorded worker
problems into two categories: injuries (accounting for 53.3% of449incidents) and illnesses (accounting for 46.7% of incidents). '
The majority of these incidents (68.1%) were reported in onshore
workers.450 Recorded illnesses included heat stress, multiple
symptoms (e.g., nausea, vomiting, headache, and dizziness),
gastrointestinal disturbances, dermatologic symptoms, general
symptoms (e.g., fatigue), cardiovascular problems, and respiratory
illness. 451 The majority of the illnesses appeared in the heat stress
and multiple symptoms categories.452 Oil and dispersants were
only "explicitly mentioned as a contributing factor" in thirteen of
the cases recorded by NIOSH, including six dermatologic, four453injury (e.g., slipping on oil), and three vapor inhalation cases.
The total recorded illnesses catalogued in the report included only
twelve cases that were severe enough to result in missed or
444 Id.
445 See generally OSHA's Efforts to Protect Workers, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.osha.gov/oilspills/ (last
visited July 23, 2012) (identifying rules such as those regulating the safety
equipment that must be used).
446 NIOSH ILLNESS AND INJURY DATA, supra note 385. While NIOSH has
since produced other reports relating to the safety and injury of workers during
the Deepwater Horizon spill cleanup, this report is the most recently published to
provide specific numerical data on types of injuries suffered by workers.
Compare id., with BRADLEY S. KING & JOHN D. GIBBINS, NAT'L INST. FOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, HEALTH HAZARD EVALUATION OF
DEEPWATER HORIZON RESPONSE WORKERS (2011), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/reports/pdfs/2010-0115-0129-3138.pdf.
447 Id. at 4.
448 Id. Another fifty injuries came from federal, state, or local government
employees, one volunteer, and nineteen unspecified. Id.
449 Id.
450 Id. at 8.
451 Id. at 13.
452 Id.
453 Id. at 17.
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restricted duty.454
Comparing current injury data with the total number of
cleanup workers may lead to the conclusion that regulations are
mitigating serious injury and illness. News reports of severe injury
or illness not captured b the NIOSH report, however, make this
conclusion less certain. These conflicting records of injury and
illness call into question the sufficiency of injury and illness
reporting requirements.
A close examination of the reporting regulation itself
demonstrates the scope of the problem. OSHA regulations exist
requiring the reporting of worker injury and illness information
from employers, but of the 2130 cases of injury or illness recorded
by NIOSH in one report, onl 281 of those cases were considered
"OSHA-recordable cases." This gap suggests that the
regulations promulgated by OSHA do not sufficiently capture the
full breadth of injuries occurring during the cleanup process.
OSHA regulation requires reporting by employers, but does not
contain any procedures for recording injuries occurring many years
from the actual cleanup efforts.4 57 Further, reliance on the NIOSH
data does not assure the same level of accurate data compilation
that may be possible through mandated reporting, as evidenced by
the failed attempts by NIOSH to acquire Exxon Valdez data.4 5 8
In addition to the above reporting concerns, the worker
population may benefit from improved monitoring and reporting of
mental health issues. Studies found that following a disaster like
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, populations experience a rise
459in mental health problems. In addition, the homeless population,
a potential subset of cleanup workers, suffers from mental illness
and substance abuse at a higher rate than the general population.4 6 0
454 Id.
455 Compare Santa Cruz & Cart, supra note 439, with NIOSH INJURY AND
ILLNESS DATA, supra note 385.
456 NIOSH INJURY AND ILLNESS REPORT, supra note 385, at 4.
457 See 29 C.F.R. § 1904.33 (2011) (requiring employers to maintain and
update injury reports for a period of five years). Some evidence of illness and
injury surrounding the Exxon Valdez spill did not turn up until years later, further
necessitating a continuing record of injury and illness data. See Kim Murphy,
Exxon Spill's Cleanup Workers Share Years of Crippling Illness, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2001, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/nov/05/news/mn-372.
458 EXXON/VALDEZHHE, supra note 425; Griffin, supra note 431.
459 See, e.g., Palinkas et al., supra note 95.
460 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, HELPING PEOPLE WITHOUT HOMES: REPORT
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Mentally unstable members of the population engulfed in the
hazards associated with the aftermath of oil spills and the cleanup
effort may find themselves in a regulatory gap that no agency is
currently equipped to handle. BP and regulators are engaged in a
myriad of injury and illness mitigation efforts through monitoring
of environmental conditions surrounding the spill, but screening
and treatment for mental illness or instability among workers is not
discussed.462
Finally, despite the low numbers of serious injuries and
illnesses reported thus far, it is too soon to be optimistic about the
effects of oil exposure on oil cleanup workers. After the Exxon
Valdez oil spill, injuries to cleanup workers often did not present
until years after exposure.463 This could be due in part to the
relative lack of data available to NIOSH following the Exxon
Valdez spill.464 However, discrepancies in data availability cannot
fully account for the reports of injuries and illness that are still
being reported twenty years after the spill.465
3. Training of Cleanup Workers
OSHA regulates the training that maritime oil spill response
workers receive, and it does so based on the Hazardous Waste
Operations and Emergency Response standard (HAZWOPER).466
HAZWOPER is a more general regulation intended to "protect
workers involved in hazardous substance emergency response and
cleanup operations." 467 While the HAZWOPER regulation
determines how those running the cleanup effort were required to
OF THE APA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON PSYCHOLOGY'S CONTRIBUTION TO
END HOMELESSNESS 14-16 (2009), available at http://www.apa.org/
pubs/info/reports/end-homelessness.pdf.
461 See Personal Exposure Monitoring Results Summary, BP, supra note 387;
OIL SPILL HAZWOPER, supra note 432.
462 Research performed in the course of writing this article demonstrated no
record of mental health monitoring or mitigation.
463 Murphy, supra note 457.
464 Id.
465 See Santa Cruz & Cart, supra note 439 (discussing injuries reported by
fishermen). Blogs have also reported a variety of injuries stemming from the
spill, though it is not clear at this point if any of these reports can be
substantiated. See, e.g., Former BP Cleanup Worker Exposes Staged Photo Ops,
Toxic Working Conditions, and Covert Ops, supra note 440.
466 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (2011); see also OIL SPILL HAZWOPER, supra
note 432.
467 OIL SPILL HAZWOPER, supra note 432.
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train employees, separate regulation actually outlines how a spill
response is organized and managed, and it includes HAZWOPER
training as a part of broader spill management.468 Any individuals
helping with the cleanup effort not covered under the OSHA
HAZWOPER regulation (like volunteers) come under the
regulatory coverage of state-level OSHA regulation or EPA
469HAZWOPER regulation. OSHA does recognize states that have
their own approved Occupational Safety and Health Plans, but
none of the Gulf region states had such plans in place.4 70
Therefore, any OSHA-related regulation pertaining to cleanup
workers, their training, and management would have happened
exclusively at the federal level in the states affected by the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
Training for response workers during an oil spill is based on
the assigned duties of the individual, and the specific training
requirements are provided for in the Code of Federal
47 1Regulations. OSHA requires three levels of training for various
types of onshore cleanup, four levels of training for those working
on marine vessels and with the Vessels of Opportunity program,
and two levels for those supervising individuals fulfilling either
472
role. Over the course of cleanup efforts, OSHA warned about
reports of trainers offering the HAZWOPER required trainings at
significantly less than the forty hours required by regulation,4 7 3
though it is not clear if OSHA took any legal action against
offending companies. OSHA asserts plainly in its training tools
that adherence to proper training guidelines is legally required to
maintain compliance with OSHA regulation, and the training
requirements are not simply guidelines to promote worker
468 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 300.150, 300.430 (2012); OIL SPILL HAZWOPER,
supra note 432.
469 OIL SPILL HAZWOPER, supra note 432. The EPA HAZWOPER standard
is identical to the OSHA HAZWOPER standard, but EPA's HAZWOPER
extends coverage to local and state government employees. Id.
470 Directory of States with Approved Occupational Safety and Health Plans,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/states.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
471 OIL SPILL HAZWOPER, supra note 432. See generally 29 C.F.R.
1920.120 (providing the general regulations which must be applied to specific oil
release incidents).
472 Current Training Requirements for the Gulf Oil Spill, supra note 328.
473 Id. (warning that "OSHA has received reports that some trainers are
offering the 40-hour HAZWOPER training in significantly less than 40 hours,
showing video presentations and offering only limited instruction").
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safety.474
Louisiana also has some relevant safety regulations that apply
to employers generally.475 The penalty for a violation of Louisiana
worker safety law is a fine "not exceeding five hundred dollars for
each offense."476 No other Gulf Coast state has a general
employee safety requirement analogous to Louisiana, and even if
more states had such laws, it is not clear that those laws would be
applicable or useful in the context of the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill.
In addition to the above regulations addressing worker safety
and training, OSHA promulgates rules requiring employers to
record and report certain injuries or illnesses incurred by
477-. .
employees. The reporting of injuries is an important step in
passing laws and implementing regulations to protect workers.478
In some respects the law appears to function properly, whereas in
other instances problems with the law have arisen or a potential
474 OIL SPILL CLEANUP INITIATIVE, NATIONAL INST. OF ENVTL. HEALTH Scis.,
supra note 420, at 7 (providing instructions for using the training tool provided
by OSHA).
475 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:13 (2010):
"Every employer shall furnish employment which shall be reasonably
safe for the employees therein. They shall furnish and use safety
devices and safeguards, shall adopt and use methods and processes
reasonably adequate to render such employment and the place of
employment safe in accordance with the accepted and approved
practice in such or similar industry or places of employment
considering the normal hazard of such employment, and shall do every
other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety and
welfare of such employees."
476 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:16 (2010).
477 See 29 C.F.R. § 1904.0-.44 (2011) (outlining general injury and illness
reporting requirements for employers). OSHA requires reporting
"if it results in any of the following: death, days away from work,
restricted work or transfer to another job, medical treatment beyond
first aid, or loss of consciousness. You must also consider a case to
meet the general recording criteria if it involves a significant injury or
illness diagnosed by a physician or other licensed health care
professional, even if it does not result in death, days away from work,
restricted work or job transfer, medical treatment beyond first aid, or
loss of consciousness."
29 C.F.R. § 1904.7 (2011).
478 Injury and Illness Prevention Programs Stakeholder Meeting: Meeting
Summary Report, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR (July 20, 2010), http://www.osha.gov/dsg/topics/safetyhealth/
07202010stakeholder-notes.html (discussing the importance of information and
data in the context of injury prevention).
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lack of information with regard to the law poses a problem.
Regarding areas of training regulation that operated well,
OSHA promulgated very specific training requirements to be met
before individuals can be a proved to work on the beaches, on the
boats, or as a supervisor. To the degree that regulations are in
place specifying the type of training cleanup workers must receive,
the law moved in the correct direction from past oil cleanup
efforts. Agencies improved regulation since the Exxon Valdez
spill,480 and improvements to the HAZWOPER training
regulation, when enforced, appear to provide the necessary
information to cleanup workers. In its current state, however, the
regulation does not mandate a demonstration of skill prior to
completing the training; no measurable means exists to determine
comprehension or skill following training.
The required training, when compared to reports of actual
training taking place, raises concerns for worker safety and
481
regulatory compliance. BP contracted with other companies in
order to administer training: PEC performed training for land-
based cleanup, while Parsons and O'Brien performed training for
482
vessel-based cleanup. OSHA allowed BP to hire other
companies to perform safety training, and OSHA subsequently
publicized reports of inadequate training taking place. A
regulatory gap existed because no entity had scrutinized the
companies tasked with worker training in order to ensure proper
administration of training programs. Whether the oversight burden
fell to BP or OSHA was unclear, but it is clear that under
HAZWOPER the proper training of these workers is important for
444their safety. OSHA requested via their website and via a
published training fact sheet that workers who did not receive
485proper training should report these problems. To ask a
potentially vulnerable cleanup worker to report the training they
just received as inadequate, thus negating the training and further
delaying the time when they can begin work, is inappropriate as a
479 See Current Training Requirements for the Gulf Oil Spill, supra note 328.
480 Compare Current Training Requirements for the Gulf Oil Spill, supra
note 328, with Murphy, supra note 457.
481 See Current Training Requirements for the Gulf Oil Spill, supra note 328.
482 Id.
483 Id.
484 Id.
485 Id.
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primary means of obtaining information about inadequate training
and simply not feasible. Though the HAZWOPER regulation does
not expressly require monitoring procedures, OSHA and BP are
much better positioned than those seeking employment to evaluate
the training procedures being administered.
Aside from the training oversight issues, a regulatory gap
exists in how to deal with individuals not accustomed to
standardized education; 487  some of the most vulnerable
populations being hired for cleanup efforts received career-specific
education as opposed to standardized education administered to the
general population.488 Reports that cleanup workers were signing
contracts to work when they could not read or write raises serious
concerns as to the sufficiency of a trainingrogram operated under
an assumption of standardized education. The current training
regulations do not contemplate the training and employment of
individuals without a basic level of education. The limited
information available made it hard to assess the negative impacts
of this regulatory gap on particular cleanup workers, but the
danger of insufficient HAZWOPER training existed.
Some of the most vulnerable populations participating in oil
cleanup, such as the previously unemployed, the homeless, and
possibly prisoners,490 are also more likely to be undereducated. It
is unclear whether those receiving training were being tested to
ensure that they fully comprehended all that was taught to them.
4. Housing of Cleanup Workers
A substantial number of people employed in cleanup efforts
live outside the Gulf Coast region, and even Gulf Coast residents
may receive assignments to work a significant distance from their
homes. This influx of non-resident cleanup workers created a
demand for temporary housing for these employees. News sources
486 See 40 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (2011).
487 See Mock, Black Gulf Fishers Face a Murky Future, supra note 310
(describing the education of oyster fishermen as being career-specific and
passed down through families, with members typically not receiving a
diploma beyond high school). Standardized education refers to the typical
American style of education of grades one through twelve.
488 Id.
489 See Noll, supra note 396 (raising serious concerns about the education
level of those entering into employment contracts).
490 See supra Part II.B.1 (noting the vulnerable populations involved in
cleanup efforts).
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reported that in one particular area, five hundred workers were
housed on barges located offshore because the area that needed
cleaning was not easily accessible by land and there was no
491
available housing nearby. The barges were forty-foot-long
corrugated steel boxes that read "Martin Quarters" on their
sides. B & J Martin, Inc., the manufacturer of these modular
buildings, confirmed on its website that it was providing temporary
housing structures to BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
respondents.4 9 3
B & J Martin, Inc., states that its modular buildings are U.S.
Coast Guard-approved and meet the A-60 class construction
requirements pursuant to American Bureau of Shipping standards,
494
as well as being blast rated. Beyond that assertion, the company
makes no claims of certification or regulation. News reports
indicate, however, that the bar4 e quarters are in compliance with
other Coast Guard regulations. Further, while these facilities are
an industry standard for many sea-going vessels and deepwater
drilling operations, it is not clear whether their use is standard in
spill cleanup operations.
On the barges, dubbed "flotels" by the press, workers were
496housed in steel boxes containing dormitory beds. Each box
housed twelve workers, there was a bathroom for every four
workers, and, pursuant to Coast Guard regulations, each worker
received thirty square feet (equivalent to an area of five feet by six
feet) of space in the living quarters. 497 The article containing the
above information only described use of these barges outside one
particular port, but BP indicated that the use of such barges could
491 Ben Nuckols, 'Flotels' Await Oil Spill Cleanup Workers on Gulf, USA
TODAY (June 3, 2010, 8:57 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/travel/hotels/2010-
06-03-flotels-gulf-oil-spillN.htm.
492 Id.
493 News, B & J MARTIN, INC., http://www.bjmartininc.com/#/?section=News
(last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
494 See id.; see also 46 C.F.R. § 127.220 (2011) (describing the A-60
classification as one applying to general fire protection in shipping regulation,
when the compartment containing the emergency source of electric power
adjoins a space containing either the service generators or vital machinery for the
ship's operation).
495 Nuckols, supra note 491 (indicating that the facilities comply with the
Coast Guard regulation that each resident gets thirty square feet of space).
496 Id.
497 Id.
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occur across the coast.498 While USA Today, BP, and the
contractors who use the barges state that the conditions are very
livable, certain conditions, such as greater confinement, are
inherent in living on a barge and do not occur in the same way in
land-based housing.499
The "flotels" were not limited to land-based workers; there
were reports that a group of fisherman went on strike to protest
being moved from motels to the "flotels."500 One fisherman
indicated that when he signed up to work, he was presented with
an agreement that he would live in a motel or "somewhere they
supplied us to live."501 The fishermen and workers complained
that they were incapable of paying for their own housing but
refused to move from their motels to the "flotels." Other workers
resolved to live in the "flotels" because they could not afford to
give up their jobs. As one worker stated, "I'll go to the Quarter
boat and make the best of it. It's their way or the highway."502
Several laws exist which might apply to these floating
barracks, but it appears that OSHA and the Coast Guard have
decided that they are under Coast Guard jurisdiction. The
manufacturer of the "flotels" references a set of apolicable Coast
Guard regulations, which reinforces this conclusion. The Coast
498 Id.
499 Flotels also have dangers not found in land-based housing. For example,
on April 12, 2011, a flotel owned by Pemex sank. Everyone was evacuated
safely. See Phaedra Friend Troy, Pemex Evacuates Personnel as Jupiter Flotel
Sinks in the Gulf of Mexico, PENNENERGY (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://www.pennenergy.com/index/petroleum/display/8332 2 8 1400/articles/penne
nergy/petroleum/offshore/2011/04/pemex-
evacuates-personnel.html?cmpid=EnlDailyPetroApril142011.
500 Fishermen Strike in Protest of 'Flotel' Housing, PROJECT NOLA (July 20,
2010, 11:15AM), http://www.projectnola.com/the-news/news/44-wdsu/ 9 82 9 2 -
fishermen-strike-in-protest-of-flotel-housing.
501 Id.
502 Floating Barges Will Be Home for Many Local Fisherman,
PROJECTNOLA.COM (July 21, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.projectnola.com/the-
news/news/42-fox-8/98360-floating-barges-will-be-home-for-many-local-
fisherman.
503 B & J MARTIN, INC., supra note 493 (listing only compliance with Coast
Guard regulation); see OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, COMPLIANCE DIRECTIVE No. CPL 02-01-047, OSHA AUTHORITY OVER
VESSELS AND FACILITIES ON OR ADJACENT TO U.S. NAVIGABLE WATERS AND THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS) G-8 (2010) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive-pdf/CPL_02-01-047.pdf ("Consistent
with longstanding policy, OSHA's Temporary Labor Camp standard contained
in 29 CFR 1910.142 does not apply to vessels (such as ships and barges). Any
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Guard regulation cited by the manufacturer pertains specifically to
504the fire rating of deck coverings on various vessels. This
regulation does not apply to actual worker conditions, but
addresses the structural soundness of the units for the purposes of
providing housing on the water.
OSHA has its own regulation for the housing of workers hired
for temporary purposes. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142, OSHA has
the power to regulate "Temporary Labor Camp s" but indicates
that these regulations do not apply to vessels. Those OSHA
regulations state that "each room used for sleeping should contain
at least 50 square feet of floor space for each occupant," with at
least seven feet of head space.5 0 6 The toilet rooms require window
access directly to the outside, as well as requiring toilet facilities
access without passage through a sleeping area. In addition, no
toilet should come within 100 feet of any sleeping room, dining
room, lunch area, or kitchen.5 0 7 The regulation pertaining to
"Temporary Labor Camps" also includes many other detailed
rules, but with regard to potential reiulation of the "flotels" the
above portions are the most relevant.
Although the Coast Guard currently regulates the "flotels"
due to their status as vessels, the temporary labor camp regulations
might in some ways be a more appropriate fit.509 Unlike workers
living and working on navigable waters to which the Coast Guard
housing regulations typically apply, many of these cleanup
workers were instead living on navigable waters while working on
hazards noted by [Compliance Safety and Health Officers] related to living
spaces on fish processing vessels will be referred in writing to the U.S. Coast
Guard.").
504 See Domestic Structural Fire Protection Materials Regulations: Deck
Coverings (A-60), U.S. COAST GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg5214/
domesticsfp.asp (last updated May 9, 2012) (citing 46 C.F.R. § 164.006
(201 1)).
505 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142 (2011); OSHA Authority Over Vessels and
Facilities on or Adjacent to U.S. Navigable Waters and the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS), supra note 503.
506 Id.
507 Id.
508 Also included in the regulation are rules pertaining to the material floors
must be made from, water supply, safety for cooking stations and kitchens, more
detailed toilet information, sewage disposal, and refuse disposal. Id.
Unfortunately, a lack of information pertaining to conditions on the barges and in
the modular housing limits this Article's ability to evaluate compliance with
these provisions.
509 Id.
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land. OSHA's temporary labor camp regulations mandate more
space and separation from toilets for housing compared to what is
available in the "flotels" and required by the Coast Guard. First,
the Coast Guard regulations require that the "flotels" provide only
thirty square feet of living space per person, while OSHA requires
fifty feet of living space per person. Further, OSHA requires
100 feet of space between toilet rooms and sleeping quarters as
well as access to toilet facilities without passing through sleeping
quarters.511 From a review of interior photos provided by B & J
Manufacturers, it appears that restroom facilities are directly
adjacent to individual bunks.512 These differences raise serious
concerns about the expectations of land-based workers suddenly
forced to live on the "flotels," and the disparities in conditions
required for people doing similar work based on whether they are
housed on land or on "flotels."
Many individuals living in these "flotels" cannot afford their
own hotels, a car to drive from the hotel to the work site, or to quit513
the job and go back to being unemployed. Beyond the
information available via the news media and the manufacturer of
the "flotels," those tasked with regulating the health and safet of
cleanup workers were silent on the use of this housing. In
addition to the previously stated OSHA compliance concerns, the
agency and governmental silence on this housing situation left
regulatory questions about specially equipping or training workers
for living on the "flotels." Living on a barge presents unique
problems and dangers not presented living on land, and the
regulatory gap into which the "flotels" fall needed to be addressed
more thoroughly by regulators.
510 See Nuckols, supra note 491.
511 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142 (2011); OSHA Authority Over Vessels and
Facilities on or Adjacent to U.S. Navigable Waters and the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS), supra note 503.
512 Martin Quarters, Gallery, B&J MARTIN, INC.,
http://www.bjmartininc.com/#/?section=Martin%20Quarters&sub= 0 (last visited
Dec. 16, 2012).
513 See Floating Barges Will Be Home for Many Local Fisherman, supra note
502.
514 Research undertaken for this article showed no mention of the use of
"flotels" for cleanup workers by the Coast Guard, OSHA, or any government
agency.
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C. Oil Rig Workers
Oil rig workers faced environmental justice issues with regard
to the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill that preceded the
explosions and continued in the spill's aftermath. BP indicated in
its own reports that lapses in procedure and regulation put the
safety of rig workers at risk on the Deepwater Horizon. This
Section considers safety, regulatory, and compensation issues
facing oil rig workers.
1. Safety and Regulatory Issues for Rig Workers
The extensive subcontracting occurring on the rigs
complicated worker safety. For example, BP leased the Deepwater
Horizon rig from Transocean, and Transocean was also
responsible for the initial drilling and operation of the well.515 In
addition, Haliburton oversaw the use of cement casing on the
. 516
rig.
The Deepwater Horizon rig workers faced an extremely
difficult task, and BP documents indicate that improper actions
were taken at the time of the accident that potentially reflected
insufficient levels of training.5 17 BP's own internal accident report
suggests that the Transocean rig crew "was not sufficiently
7518prepared to manage an escalating well control situation." BP
further indicates that Transocean's emergency policies and
519procedures for dealing with the situation were inadequate. The
fact that these policies and procedures appear inadequate and
unclear indicates that a potential chain of command problem also
may have contributed to the rig crew's failure to properly
recognize and respond to warning signs as the well deteriorated.
Further, the level of subcontracting on the Deepwater Horizon has
thus far made it difficult to pinpoint a single player as being at
fault.
In addition to these issues, the rig itself did not possess
enough fail-safes and emergency controls to ensure worker safety.
None of the protective systems could stop the flow of
515 BP ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 21, at 17; see also
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
516 BP ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 21, at 23.
517 Id. at 44.
518 Id.
519 Id. at 99.
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hydrocarbons, nor did systems effectively control potential ignition
sources. BP's accident report suggests one cause of this protective
gap was a "high level of reliance upon manual/human intervention
in the activation of Deepwater Horizon safety systems, which
included well control response."520 A look into Transocean's
maintenance records of the rig reveals an ineffective maintenance
management system.521 A prior incident at the well site on.March
8, 2010, revealed that the crews were unprepared to deliver an
effective emergency response, yet Transocean took no actions to
correct the situation.52 Transocean's maintenance records were
also organized in such a way as to make it very difficult to track
and ensure regulatory compliance.523 The accident report made
mention of inadequate testing procedures from Haliburton that
made the development of correct risk assessment and safety
precautions difficult.524 Based on this information, it is clear that
serious questions exist about the sufficiency of precautions to
protect rig workers from a potential well fail.
When the rig exploded, the rig employees were thrust into a
hostile environment. Unlike a simple leak or spill, the Deepwater
Horizon failure resulted in a series of explosions beginning at 9:49
PM on April 20, as efforts to stabilize the rig were unsuccessful.525
Of the 126 workers on board at the time, seventeen suffered
serious injury and eleven lost their lives. 526 Not all of the 126 rig
workers were BP employees; Transocean employed many, while
the others were from contracted firms such as Haliburton,
Anadarko, and M-I Swaco. 527
Following the evacuation, BP kept some rig workers on boats
or other rigs for fifteen hours or more.528 When the company
520 Id. at 139.
521 Id. at 48.
522 Id. at 107.
523 Id. at 167.
524 Id. at 67.
525 Id. at 29.
526 Id. at 9.
527 Joel Achenbach, Oil Spill Hearings Focus on Who Was in Charge After
the Blast, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/05/AR2010100501793.html (identifying those
companies as being present at the BP Hearings).
528 Joseph Shapiro, Rig Survivors Felt Coerced to Sign Waivers, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (May 6, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld= 126565283.
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finally brought the workers to shore, BP immediately presented the
rig workers with boilerplate waiver forms, in what some have
speculated was an attempt to absolve their employer, Transocean,
from liability.529 Transocean claimed the forms were standard
after such an event and that Coast Guard practices were
responsible for causing the delays in bringing rig workers home.5 3 0
2. Compensation for Injured Rig Workers
Relief for injured oil workers is available under general
federal maritime law, the Jones Act,531 and for the family of those532
rig workers killed, the Death on the High Seas Act. The Outer533Continental Shelf Lands Act provides the relevant structure for
federal regulation affecting the safety standards for oil rig workers.
For oil rig workers injured on the Deepwater Horizon,
compensation under maritime law is the simplest form of relief.
Deep water drilling operations are subject to federal law through
the jurisdictional provision of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, which states that "the district courts of the United States shall
have jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising out of, or in
connection with any operation conducted on the Outer Continental
Shelf which involves exploration, development, or production of
the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental
Shelf, or which involves rights to such minerals."534 Within
federal courts, deep water oil rig workers are treated under
maritime contract, with the Fifth Circuit holding that "even a
contract for offshore drilling services that does not mention a5n
vessel is maritime if its execution requires the use of vessels."
Admiralty law provides a generalized liability in which the
"employer's responsibility for maintenance and cure extends
beyond injuries sustained because of or while engaged in,
activities required by his employment." Under general maritime
529 Id.
530 Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Ltd. Issues Statement of
Clarification (May 11, 2010), available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c= 113031&p=irol-newsArticle pf&ID=1425590&
highlight=.
531 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006 & Supp. I).
532 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006).
533 See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2006).
534 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) (2006).
535 Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 500-01 (5th Cir. 2002).
536 Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 732 (1943).
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law "the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the
negligence of the master, or any member of the crew, but is
entitled to maintenance and cure whether the injuries were
received by negligence or accident." 3
The most important statute potentially covering oil rig
workers is the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, more commonly
538known as the Jones Act. The statute states that "a seaman
injured in the course of employment or, if the seaman dies from-
the injury, the personal representative of the seaman may elect to
bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the
employer." 539 The Jones Act gives a seaman "the right to sue in an
action at law for damages arising from the negligence of the owner
or personnel of a 'vessel' aboard which the seaman is
employed.',540 The Act "does not define the term 'seaman' and
therefore leaves to the courts the determination of exactly which
maritime workers are entitled to admiralty's special protection."54 1
A worker making a claim under the Jones Act has a number
of categories of damages from which to ensure relief. Courts have
recognized that a plaintiff in a Jones Act suit "is entitled to recover
damages for all his past, present and probable future harm
attributable to the defendant's tortious conduct. Those damages
,542include pain and suffering and mental anguish." A Jones Act
claim can also seek damages for loss of past wages and loss of
future earning capacity, both current and future medical
expenses,544 and interest "as compensation for the use of funds to
which the claimant was rightfully entitled."545
For oil rig workers seeking compensation for injuries under
the Jones Act, the first step is to determine just how they, as well
as the rigs they work on, are classified under the law. In order to be
537 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
538 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006 & Supp. II).
539 Id.
540 Offshore Co. v. Robinson, 266 F.2d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 1959).
541 Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 355 (1995).
542 Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir.
1986).
543 See, e.g., Johnson v. Offshore Exp., Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir.
1988).
544 See, e.g., Saleeby v. Kingsway Tankers, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 879, 883
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
545 See, e.g., Courville v. Cardinal Wireline Specialists, Inc., 775 F. Supp.
929, 940 (W.D. La. 1991).
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covered under the Jones Act, a worker must meet two distinct
criteria.546 First, the worker must be considered a "seaman" for the
purpose of the statute. "Seaman" has been construed broadly in a
number of federal decisions 547 and applies well to this context.
Suit has already been filed by several Deepwater Horizon oil rig
548
workers based on Jones Act claims.
Second, in order to be covered as a Jones Act seaman, the
Deepwater Horizon itself must also be classified as a vessel. Rigs
sharing many of the characteristics of the Deepwater Horizon have
been found by courts to be vessels for Jones Act classification,
focusing on factors which designate "the purpose for which the
549
craft is constructed and the business in which it is engaged." A
"non-self-propelled barge which is moved from one drilling
location to another by tugs . .. and is fitted with sleeping quarters
and a galley," was considered for vessel classification where the
court found "there can be little question that the drilling barge
known as Rig No. 4 is a vessel." 5 5 The mobile nature of a rig such
as the Deepwater Horizon, which is designed to establish drilling
sites and move on to new prospects, makes it highly likely that it
would be classified as a vessel under the Jones Act.
The Death on the High Seas Act also allows members of a
deceased seaman's family to bring suit.551 The Death on the High
Seas Act "limits the class of beneficiaries to the decedent's 'wife,
husband, parent, child, or dependent relative,' establishes a two-
year period of limitations ... and provides that contributory
546 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006 & Supp. II).
547 McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 346 (1991); see, e.g.,
Guilbeau v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co., 215 F. Supp. 909, 911-12 (E. D. La.
1963); cf Holland v. Allied Structural Steel Co., 539 F.2d 476, 479-80 (5th Cir.
1976) (while definition of "seaman" is expanded far beyond formally assigned
maritime crews, steel worker who fell from bridge under repair by floating
cranes is only connected to the vessel in a transitory capacity, and was not
injured in the course of service of that vessel).
548 Christopher Bauer, Injured Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig Workers and
Widow File Jones Act Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Lawsuit Against BP
in Galveston, LEXIsNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES LAW COMMUNITY (May 6, 2010,
1:45 PM) http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/emergingissues/blogs/
gulf oil-spill/archive/2010/05/06/injured-deepwater-horizon-oil-rig-workers-
and-widow-file-jones-act-personal-inj ury-and-wrongful-death-lawsuit-against-
bp-in-galveston.aspx.
549 Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Inc., 575 F.2d 1140, 1142
(5th Cir. 1978).
550 Guilbeau, 215 F. Supp. at 910-ll.
551 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006).
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negligence will not bar recovery." 552 An action under the Death on
the High Seas Act does not require negligence, as the Act "gives a
remedy for breach of the warranty of seaworthiness and .. . the
libellant may recover thereunder without proof of negligence or
culpability."553 This degree of freedom in structuring claims works
to the benefit of the victims and ensures that they have a greater
chance in receiving effective relief.
However, the narrow scope of the Death on the High Seas Act
may make it ineffective as a con5pehensive source of relief for
those dependent on the deceased. By limiting the payment of
benefits to those fully dependent on the deceased, the statute
constrains recovery to the benefit of the responsible party and at
the expense of the victim. For some workers, the coverage under
this act is extremely low. For example, the family of one deceased
rig worker, who was single with no dependents, may end up
claiming no more than $1000 under the Death on the High Seas
Act; his body was never found, so the lower funeral cost translated
to an even lower payout.555 The Senate is currently considering
Senate Bill 3463, which would expand coverage to non-pecuniary
damages and pre-death pain and suffering and is a companion
bill to the already-passed House Resolution 5503.557 The pending
legislation, however, does not address the limited set of people
covered by the Act and did not make significant progress in the558Senate after it was introduced.
552 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 620 (1978).
553 Chermesino v. Vessel Judith Lee Rose, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 36, 39 (D.
Mass. 1962).
554 Cf Lawson v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)
(allowing deceased bigamist's second, illegitimate but bona fide, wife to recover
under DOHSA).
555 Stephanie Mencimer, Will the Cruise Ship Industry Do BP's Dirty Work?,
THE ATLANTIC (June 16, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/nationaU
archive/2010/06/will-the-cruise-ship-industry-do-bps-dirty-work/58188/.
556 Survivors Equality Act of 2010, S.3463, 111th Cong. (2010); Jim Walker,
Death on the High Seas Act Protects BP and Cruise Lines at the Grieving
Family's Expense, CRUISE L. NEWS, June 16, 2010,
http://www.cruiselawnews.com/2010/06/articles/maritime-death/death-on-the-
high-seas-act-protects-bp-and-cruise-lines-at-the-grieving-familys-expensel.
557 H.R. 5503, 111th Cong. (2010), available at
http://www.opencongress.org/billlll -h5503/text; Kim Geiger, House OKs Bill
to Allow Deepwater Horizon Victims' Families to Sue, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/OI/nation/la-na-high-seas-20100702.
558 See Bill Summary & Status-111th Congress (2009-2010) S. 3463,
LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
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The dangers facing rig workers were made greater by the lack
of effective training, planning, and consistency of maintenance
aboard the Deepwater Horizon. Regulations and safety procedures
in place at the time of the accident, paired with the way in which
they were operationalized, did not prevent worker injury. In the
aftermath of the spill, the Jones Act and other compensation
mechanisms provide some relief for the injured workers. However,
the Death on the High Seas Act, unless amended significantly,
provides only Jimited relief for the family of the rig workers that
were killed.
V. TOWARDS GREATER JUSTICE
The preceding Parts reveal an overwhelming mosaic of justice
problems involving many different laws and regulatory entities.
However, despite their substantive diversity, they have three
common themes: (1) powerful oil interests have structured laws in
ways that make deepwater drilling easier and provide insufficient
protection for vulnerable populations; (2) although both the
government and companies at times made efforts to be sensitive to
environmental justice concerns, these concerns were incorporated
incompletely; and (3) inadequate information collection often
makes precise analysis of environmental justice hard. These
themes provide the basis for the proposals of this Part for
addressing environmental justice more effectively in this context.
A. Statutory Reform
The statutes and regulations applicable to the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill structured the environmental injustice in its
aftermath in two primary ways. First, many of the laws applicable
provide exceptions or flexibility that operated to create unfairness.
Second, many of the provisions for compensating vulnerable
populations have limitations that create risks of unfairness.
Changing these laws would make a major difference in achieving
environmental justice.
The first problem infused the regulatory process leading up to
the spill, and the Obama Administration is reforming offshore
drilling regulation to ensure more rigorous environmental review
and oversight of projects. However, these reforms still miss other
important gaps. Most significantly, so long as RCRA designates
z?dI 11 :S.3463:@@@L (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
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oil spill waste for municipal solid waste landfills, an environmental
justice problem will persist due to the unequal siting of these
landfills. This spill exacerbated that base justice problem because
of its size and, in so doing, suggests a possibility for reform.5 5 9
Even if elimination of the exception is not politically feasible in
the current political climate, limiting its applicability to smaller
spills might help to address the overloading of municipal landfills
that occurred in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill.
Moreover, in many instances, a tightening of regulatory
oversight could make a difference. For example, the HAZWOPER
training for cleanup workers is adequate when properly
administered, but there were 56inificant uncertainties regarding
whether this was the case here. Regulations could mandate post-
training tests instead of leaving that testing up to the discretion of
those providing the training to help make sure that those
interacting with hazardous materials actually have the knowledge
they need to be safe.
The second problem could be addressed through a variety of
reforms to the laws and structures for compensation. Most
fundamentally, the magnitude of this spill reinforced that the
liability caps in the OPA are too low to provide adequate
compensation for victims. In addition, the elimination of the
GCCF's late November deadline for emergency payments or, at
the very least, clearer advertisement of its significance would have
helped ensure that it did not have a differential effect on those who
are less educated, face language barriers, or have fewer resources
to support representation. While the GCCF has taken steps to
address these concerns, we should learn from this problem to set
up such a fund differently in the first place in the future.5 6 1
More broadly, the spill highlighted the need to revisit
categories for compensation. For example, the decision to exclude
mental health problems from GCCF compensation made it even
harder for poor people to get the services that they needed.5 62
Additional funds or free services to help address the serious mental
health implications of the spill, whether provided for through the
559 See supra Part II.A.
560 See supra Part IV.B.
561 See supra Part III.B.
562 See id.
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GCCF or elsewhere, are needed. Similarly, limiting compensation
under the Death on the High Seas Act to dependents and
constraining significantly the types of damages available even to
that group means that many people significantly affected by the
deaths of oil rig workers have limited mechanisms to be
compensated for their losses.563 Reforms under consideration to
expand these mechanisms could support fairer and more
compassionate treatment of those suffering the loss of loved ones
in the aftermath of the spill.
B. Better Incorporation of Environmental Justice into Decision
Making
Even if the barriers facing the above reforms are too great to
make such measures politically viable, many of the environmental
justice problems in the aftermath of the spill could have been
significantly ameliorated through a more rigorous and consistent
application of existing environmental justice law and policy. The
problems with the spill response in particular suggest that cross-
cutting interactions create environmental justice danger zones.
Even if individual agencies are implementing their environmental
justice mandates, these mandates need to be integrated clearly into
each step of oil spill regulation and disaster planning.
This integration needs to begin before any spills take place,
with the regulation of offshore drilling and disaster planning.
While the more rigorous environmental regulatory process that the
Obama Administration is implementing certainly helps
environmental justice by making everyone safer, that process
needs to explore the differential risks faced by vulnerable
populations and any specific measures needed to provide them
with greater protection. Similarly, the more environmental justice
is specifically addressed in each component of the National
Contingency Plan process, the greater the likelihood that these
concerns will be adequately addressed in an emergency that
requires quick action. For example, assuming that the proposed
reforms to the waste disposal exception do not take place, the plan
can work to identify a demographically diverse set of disposal sites
and make sure that a low-income community of color does not get
designated to receive such a high percentage of the waste, as
occurred in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
563 See supra Part IV.C.
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Rigorous environmental justice monitoring needs to take
place in the aftermath of the spill as well. Since these concerns can
be lost in both the haste of emergency response and the complexity
of many agencies interacting, a person designated to monitor
environmental justice on the National Contingency Plan team
could help to ensure their consistent consideration. That person
could assess plans for their differential impacts and explore
whether less unfair alternatives exist. If that person were both
integrated at a high level into the planning process and in touch
with an organized network of citizen groups representing
vulnerable populations, environmental justice would be addressed
much more rigorously in the response than it was in the aftermath
of this spill.
The Obama Administration has an opportunity to create these
reforms, without navigating the complexities of legislative change,
during its current reexamination of the National Contingency Plan
process. The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling suggested a variety of ways in
which that process could be more inclusive of state and local
actors, but did not specifically address this environmental justice
aspect of inclusivity. However, the need to create clearer pathways
for these concerns to be addressed in the process is just as
important for creating a fairer and more harmonious response in
the future.
C. Creation of More Information Pathways
Whichever scheme is adopted moving forward, efforts to
address environmental justice require adequate information.
Vulnerable populations need to know what their options are and
how to access the resources available to them. Those concerned
about advancing environmental justice need to know what
differential effects are taking place and why. Both of these types of
information were sometimes inadequate in the aftermath of the
spill.
The government responders made significant efforts to create
the first type of information flow. Claim centers existed to help
people with their efforts to gain compensation. OSHA warned
workers that training might be inadequate. To address language
barriers, materials were distributed in multiple languages.5 6
564 See supra Part IV.A.
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Even with these efforts, gaps still remained. For example, the
representation of the GCCF emergency claims process may not
have adequately conveyed the significance of that deadline or
made sure that those with the least resources to meet it did so. The
existence of reports of people receiving unequal distribution of
compensation for similar losses (or even more compensation with
less loss) sugests that individuals' ability to submit claims may
have varied. These concerns suggest the need to systematically
review how information can be distributed most effectively to
close these gaps.
With respect to the second type of information flow, more
consistent collection of demographic information would help to
reveal patterns and, as a result, places where intervention should
occur. This information is important with respect to each aspect of
the response, compensation, and protection of workers. For
example, the disaggregation of health data (while respecting
confidentiality) in the context of both the spill itself and of injured
cleanup and oil rig workers can reveal whether more vulnerable
populations were disproportionately impacted. The collection of
clearer demographic data of cleanup workers and trainees would.
reveal potential patterns in who was employed and the adequacy of
training. Opportunities for environmental justice assessment were
often lost in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
because of inadequate data collection. These specific issues
occurred in a broader context where the government struggled to
gain adequate information about the spill itself.
Addressing these informational concerns could also be part of
the above-mentioned systematic review. Such a review should
consider the categories of demographic data that would be most
helpful for environmental justice assessment, the extent to which
such information is being collected now, which types of collection
are most feasible, and how to navigate privacy concerns.
Reexamining information flow in both of these contexts would
help to ensure that future environmental justice analysis can occur
more efficiently and effectively.
565 See Kim Barker, 'Spillionaires' Are the New Rich After BP Oil Spill
Payouts, WASH. PosT, Apr. 13, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
spillionaires-are-the-new-rich-after-bp-oil-spill-
payouts/2011/04/1 1/AFjaqsWDstory.html.
566 See supra Parts IV-V.
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CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF OIL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
While the full impact of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
will only become clearer over a period of years, the response to it
highlighted equality problems embedded in laws and the way in
which the government implements them. These are problems that
we do not need to wait for more data to fix. They require legal
reform and a systematic rethinking of how environmental justice is
approached in the context of deepwater drilling and oil spills.
Moreover, the differential distribution of risks and benefits in
this context reinforces the need for context-specific analyses of
environmental justice concerns arising from complex
environmental problems. When a wide range of entities interact
through laws covering many substantive areas, equality concerns
can be lost. Systematic examination of legal provisions for ways in
which they create conditions of inequality, of plans for cross-
crosscutting interaction to ensure that they incorporate
environmental justice, and of information flows to ensure that
vulnerable populations get resources and those assessing
environmental justice can do so would make a difference. This
type of examination needs to occur in the context of this spill and
more broadly.
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